Opening the closed shop: the Galveston Longshoremen's Strike, 1920-1921 by Abel, Joseph Anthony
  
OPENING THE CLOSED SHOP: 
 
THE GALVESTON LONGSHOREMEN'S STRIKE, 1920-1921 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
JOSEPH ANTHONY ABEL 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: History 
 OPENING THE CLOSED SHOP: 
THE GALVESTON LONGSHOREMEN'S STRIKE, 1920-1921 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
by 
 
JOSEPH ANTHONY ABEL 
 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
_________________________                                        _________________________ 
  David Vaught            Robert Resch 
      (Chair of Committee)              (Member) 
 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
 Gregory Pappas         Walter Buenger 
      (Member)    (Head of Department) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2004 
 
 
Major Subject: History 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Opening the Closed Shop: 
The Galveston Longshoremen’s Strike, 1920-1921. (December 2004) 
Joseph Anthony Abel, B.A., University of Houston 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. David Vaught 
 
 
 
 Beginning in March of 1920, the Galveston coastwise longshoremen’s strike 
against the Morgan-Southern Pacific and Mallory steamship lines was a pivotal moment 
in the history of organized labor in Texas.  Local and statewide business interests proved 
their willingness to use the state apparatus by calling on Governor William P. Hobby and 
the Texas National Guard to open the Port of Galveston.  Despite this, the striking 
dockworkers maintained the moral support of many local citizens from a variety of 
social classes, including small merchants and officials of the Galveston municipal 
government.  By February of 1921, however, the segregated locals representing the 
striking longshoremen had fallen victim to the divisive racial tactics of the shipping 
companies, who implemented the open-shop policy of non-discrimination in hiring on 
their docks.  Further demonstrating the capital-state alliance, the Texas legislature passed 
Governor Hobby’s notorious Open Port Law in October 1920, making it virtually illegal 
for dockworkers and others to engage in strikes deemed harmful to commerce.  This 
legislation and the nearly yearlong strike not only destroyed the coastwise longshore 
unions in Galveston, but ushered in a decade of repression from which Texas’s 
organized labor movement did not recover for many years.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 On March 19, 1920, the normally bustling docks of the Morgan Steamship Line 
lay vacant.  That morning, nine hundred white coastwise longshoremen failed to appear 
for work at the eight o’clock starting time.  Several blocks away, seven hundred black 
longshoremen prepared the holds of the Mallory Line’s steamships, but following the 
noon lunch hour, they too walked off their jobs.  The next day a small article hidden 
within the Galveston Daily News announced matter-of-factly “Dockworkers Strike for 
Increased Wages.”1  Little did the paper or the men know that they would soon 
participate in Texas’s most important labor dispute of the 1920s.   
 Like most of their counterparts throughout the country, the Galveston 
longshoremen advocated “pure-and-simple” unionism.  Their demands included higher 
wages and a louder voice in the forces that governed their lives.  When these workers 
left the docks, they did so not as class warriors, or Socialist activists, or civil libertarians, 
but as loyal Americans.  None of them intended to foment a revolution or unnecessarily 
disturb the social system that surrounded them in the early twentieth century.  In return 
for this loyalty, the men wanted a greater share of the wealth they produced.  Recent 
history contained many indications that their demands would receive a fair hearing.  
Across the nation, unionists expressed optimism that the wartime courtship between 
themselves and federal officials would produce even greater benefits in the postwar era.  
State-sponsored mediation organizations such as the National Adjustment Commission 
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(NAC) seemed to promise a less conflict-ridden future for both capital and labor.  To 
many it appeared that the United States might soon realize its long held dream of 
prosperity for all. 
 The 1920s, however, promised something very different from the halcyon days 
of World War I labor relations.  After making the world safe for democracy, the United 
States government forgot about its allies in the labor movement.  Workers and unions 
throughout the country began to feel the familiar sting of repression almost as soon as 
the battles on the western front ended.  The Red Scare, Attorney General Palmer’s raids, 
and the massive steel and coal strikes that federal forces helped crush in 1919 all 
exemplified the sea change in attitude toward organized labor.  These events 
accompanied the revitalization of the once strong open-shop movement.  Playing off the 
ultra-patriotism of the war, the movement’s new supporters euphemistically named their 
anti-union doctrine the “American Plan.”  Increasingly, even the most conservative 
unions became associated with radicalism and “un-American” values.  Despite their 
good intentions and reluctance to strike, Galveston’s dockworkers became the first group 
of Texas unionists following the war to face this growing counterrevolution.  The 
coastwise longshoremen’s strike transformed not only Galveston and its waterfront, but 
the entire state as well.  When the smoke cleared in February 1921, business interests 
had thrown open the doors on the waterfront’s closed-shop.  They had also initiated a 
struggle between themselves and organized labor in Texas that continued for the 
remainder of the decade.  Conflict on Galveston Island helped reveal the lie of the 
“Prosperity Decade” to all Lone Star labor unionists.      
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*  *  *  * 
 Like most human beings, historians expend a great deal of energy 
commemorating the successes of the past.  A desire to discount and marginalize failures 
and setbacks often accompanies this.  The winners, as the saying goes, write history; 
Clio’s dustbin stands reserved for all the rest.  Southern labor history is especially prone 
to such oversights.  Far too often, scholars have neglected workers in both southern 
history and labor history.  For years, they assumed that the Mason-Dixon Line separated 
a class-conscious group of northern industrial wage earners from their ignorant and 
subservient southern counterparts, who toiled hopelessly in the company towns of a vast 
open-shop landscape.  Although various explanations attempted to account for this 
apparent divergence between northern and southern workers, the conclusions remained 
the same: the chronic failures of southern unions consigned them to a footnote in studies 
of the South and American labor.   
 For years, this so-called old southern labor history dominated studies of workers 
and unions in the South.  The work of historian George Tindall is a case in point.  “In the 
Southern workers’ agrarian heritage lurked a fateful paradox,” he argued, “a fierce and 
petulant individualism combined with attitudes of dependency and obeisance.  The 
worker often ‘appreciated’ his job and deferred to the leadership of the gentry…[This] 
agrarian heritage had erected mental barriers to unionism.”  Where they existed, unions 
only interested southern workers as instruments of immediate protest.  Employers 
counteracted this through paternalism and appeals to individuality.  Most southerners 
believed unions challenged economic progress, Tindall continued, and saw organizers as 
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“‘yankee carpet-baggers’ attempting to keep all Southerners from tasting the sweet fruit 
of industrialization and higher incomes.”  Despised by workers, employers, and the 
public, labor activism never affected more than minor improvements in the lives of 
southern workers.  In general, though, unions represented an alien presence in southern 
society.  The region’s workers simply did not have the psychological prerequisites to 
build a successful labor movement.2   
 As it has in nearly all studies of the South, race also figured prominently in the 
old southern labor histories.  Further complicating their mental shortcomings, a strict 
racial hierarchy divided black and white southern workers.  White laborers, so the 
argument ran, acted in ways that reflected their racial rather than class identities.  
Traditions of paternalism and segregation of the races created a malleable southern work 
force, divided against itself and with little recourse to any kind of labor activism.  What 
few unions existed, whites dominated and used to exclude African-Americans from the 
most highly paid skilled occupations.  Blacks responded to this racism with a wariness of 
trade unionism and many drifted toward the pro-business position of men such as 
Booker T. Washington.  Rather than agitate for higher pay or better hours and conditions 
alongside racist whites, blacks provided a ready pool of reserve labor that employers 
frequently used to break southern strikes.  The few unions that successfully organized 
blacks, such as the United Mine Workers, did so out of expediency and proved 
exceptions to the rule.  According to historian Rick Halpern, this helped explain why the 
South, “remained a vast open-shop thorn in the side of the [American] labor 
movement.”3   
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 In their now classic study of black workers in America, Sterling D. Spero and 
Abram L. Harris directly implicated the South, arguing, “Even when adopted as a matter 
of expediency, [segregation] hinders the development of trade union consciousness 
among a class of workers whose industrial traditions are agricultural and servile.”  More 
than anything else, African-Americans’ slave heritage made them unsuitable for 
unionization without prior education.  “These attitudes which made the Negro an 
obedient, uncomplaining, docile worker, grateful for his job,” Spero and Harris claimed, 
“naturally made it exceedingly difficult for the unions to organize him and almost 
impossible for them to induce him to strike.”4  Even the most prestigious southern 
historians made these racial arguments about the southern labor movement.  C. Van 
Woodward noted in his masterpiece that segregationist policies dominated southern 
unions.  “Sometimes aided by employers’ policy of hiring, sometimes encouraged by 
politicians,” he argued, “white labor kept up an unremitting pressure to drive Negroes 
out of the better paid, more attractive work, and further down in the job hierarchy.”  One 
of the first scholars to write a synthesis of southern labor, F. Ray Marshall also 
emphasized the importance of the African-American middle class in forging a distinct 
class seemingly unwilling to organize.5
 Whether they focused on the southerner’s psychological defects or his virulent 
racism, all old southern labor historians agreed upon the futility of union organization 
and strikes.  Both seemed destined to shatter upon the rock of paternalistic employers, 
individualistic workers, and an unfriendly public.  Existing studies of the Galveston 
dockworkers’ struggle fit comfortably into this tradition and accept most of its outdated 
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conclusions.  These works fall into one of two categories: short chronological narratives 
lacking substantial analysis, or analytical narratives focusing only on a particular stage 
of the strike and neglecting the overall picture.  Because they fail to utilize the strike in 
addressing larger questions pertaining to the American and southern labor movements, 
these studies leave a significant gap in the historiography.  Based on a portion of his 
doctoral dissertation, James Maroney’s article “The Galveston Longshoremen’s Strike of 
1920” provides an example of the chronological narrative category.  Maroney argues 
that “the conflict resulted in near total destruction of the Galveston locals of the 
International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and passage of an Open Port Law by 
the Texas Legislature.”  Although based on a fair number of primary sources, this brief 
work lacks analysis of larger themes connected to the strike, most notably the racial 
question.  Although two separate and segregated unions struck, they move through the 
narrative as one.  The article’s inattention to race relations leads the reader to believe 
that white and black longshoremen ended the strike together, when in fact racial conflict 
and division dominated the final months.  Maroney also fails to emphasize the 
connection between the establishment of martial law and the growing commitment of 
open-shop forces to the destruction of unions in Galveston and Texas.6
 Harry Krenek follows much the same pattern in his book, The Power Vested: The 
Use of Martial Law and the National Guard in Texas Domestic Crisis, 1919-1932, in 
which he devotes a chapter to the Galveston troubles.  Unlike Maroney, however, 
Krenek places more emphasis on the role played by the National Guard and its day-to-
day activities during the occupation of Galveston.  Focusing almost entirely on the 
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period from June to October 1920, the strike serves as little more than background to the 
activities of the state militia.  Krenek presents a romantic vision of martial law in which 
disinterested soldiers and officers uphold law, order, and the interests of Texas against 
rioting workers and their uncooperative municipal allies.  When he does address the 
strike, Krenek accepts without question the conclusions of business and military 
supporters to justify the presence of troops on the island.  By assuming that a “domestic 
crisis” existed in Galveston, the very subtitle of the work indicates its author’s bias.  This 
anti-labor tone reinforces the position of the old southern labor historians.  Even before it 
confronted the indomitable sons-of-Texas in the state militia, the disorder caused by the 
Galveston strike assured its failure.7
 Diverging from both these examples, William D. Angel, Jr. provides a much 
more useful analysis of the motives underlying the strike in his article “Controlling the 
Workers: The Galveston Dock Workers’ Strike of 1920 and its Impact on Labor 
Relations in Texas.”  Angel argues that the Galveston situation demonstrated “the brutal 
willingness of private businessmen to ally with the state to create open-shop working 
conditions.”  The actions taken by Governor William P. Hobby and his business 
supporters in the Island City provided his more reactionary successors with a precedent 
for limiting union activity throughout the state.  Unfortunately, source limitations 
overshadow this astute emphasis on the state-business alliance and severely weaken 
Angel’s argument.  On questions such as race relations and public attitudes towards the 
strike, Angel too falls into the same trap as Maroney and Krenek, providing little 
analysis of these important elements.8
 
 8
 None of these three studies directly confronts the key historiographical issue of 
the strike, Texas exceptionalism.  All historians, especially those engaged in local or 
regional scholarship, grapple with the question of how their subject fits into the larger 
narrative of American history.  The old southern labor historians had no difficulty 
arguing for the South’s uniqueness.  Psychology, racism, and cheap wages explained 
southern workers’ aversion to unionization and their distinctiveness from laborers in the 
rest of the nation.  “Although we shall note that the south’s individual characteristics are 
being dissolved by industrialization, causing its economic, political, and social 
institutions increasingly to be patterned after those of the nation,” argued F. Ray 
Marshall, “there can be little question that from an historical viewpoint the south is 
unique by almost any definition.”9   
 In Texas, regional exceptionalism has become something of an art form.  The 
bumper sticker proverb “I’m from Texas—What country are you from?” is an overly-
simplistic, yet fairly accurate description of how historians and citizenry view events in 
the state’s past.  Ask any group of students in the Lone Star State’s public schools and 
they will confirm the immortality of events and figures such as the Alamo and San 
Jacinto, Stephen F. Austin and Sam Houston.  For many Texans, this hubris justifies the 
separation of their own past from that of everyone else.  Historians Walter Buenger and 
Robert Calvert contend that this Anglo-Texan myth has severely hindered the study of 
the state’s complicated past, arguing that “selective historical memory persists and Texas 
elites in particular still profess at least a limited subscription to that romantic concept of 
Texas.”  Confusion over the state’s identity has only furthered this romanticism.  Unsure 
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whether they belong to the slaveholding Deep South or the cattle ranching Wild West, 
most Texas historians are content to ignore interpretive innovations in both fields with 
the simple argument that the state has always been unique.  Because the “shelf life” of 
this mythic past refuses to expire among scholars of the state, notions of exceptionalism 
continue to exert a powerful, reactionary force on state historiography.  Even the new 
social history of the 1960s and 1970s did not dislodge this extreme conservatism and the 
reluctance to accept new interpretations.  By continually reproducing accounts of the 
heroic nineteenth century, historians have ignored critical events and conflicts that 
shaped the twentieth century.10
 Texas workers in particular have suffered from this confining historiography.  In 
their attempts to recapture and celebrate a more romantic past, many historians have 
imposed an artificial barrier separating the state’s workers from their counterparts 
throughout the nation.  Simple, narrowly focused studies of industries and their pioneers, 
Buenger argues, “include few links to the world outside the firm or industry and almost 
no analytical framework for evaluating long-term changes in the state’s economy.”11  
Determined to celebrate the state’s seemingly harmonious and ideal frontier days, old 
Texas labor historians marginalized the problems associated with a transforming urban 
industrial society and failed to acknowledge the connection this process shared with 
other regions of the country.  Scholars of Texas’s longshoremen, for example, inevitably 
focused on the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association (SBA) of Galveston.  Few of these 
scholars seemed to realize that the craft exclusionism and do-it-yourself voluntarism 
practiced by these labor aristocrats differed little from that practiced by other skilled 
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American workers.  By disassociating their subjects from the rest of the nation, Texas 
labor historians have missed many opportunities to utilize the arguments of a prolific and 
dynamic field of historical inquiry.12   
 Such notions of Texas exceptionalism dominate all three studies of the Galveston 
strike.  Although Angel’s article attempts to bridge the gap between this old regionalism 
and more broadly defined interpretations of American labor movements, all three studies 
of the coastwise strike fail to connect the troubles with the growing, nationwide hostility 
toward organized labor in the 1920s.  The longshoremen stand alone as casualties of the 
state’s returning postwar prosperity, when in fact they exemplified the weakened 
position of the entire labor movement during the “Prosperity Decade.”  Though the 
strike brought this reality home to Texas, Maroney, Krenek, and Angel overlook the 
connections it shared with larger events in the nation.13  This trio also fails to employ 
potentially helpful conceptual frameworks found in other historical fields and studies of 
labor; as a result, they do not provide answers to such important questions as public 
attitudes toward the strikers and the racial dynamic on Galveston’s waterfront.  When 
combined with the outdated framework of the old southern labor history, this 
exceptionalism prevents a full understanding of the Galveston strike’s significance to 
Texas as well as American labor history.  Overcoming these confining legacies is an 
essential task that one must achieve in order to chart an original course, but as all 
historians know, this proves much more daunting than it would first appear. 
 One of the greatest challenges lying before all revisionist historians is the simple 
fact that the conclusions reached by their predecessors often seem quite sound and 
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logical.  It appears in retrospect, for example, that most if not all southern unions and the 
strikes they provoked fit the pattern described by the old southern labor historians as 
exercises in futility.  Employer paternalism and white racism do indeed appear as 
convincing explanations for the impotency and constant failures of the southern labor 
movements.  Disavowing notions of exceptionalism proves just as difficult.  Native 
Texas pride notwithstanding, innumerable works, both popular and scholarly, celebrate 
the uniqueness of the Lone Star State even within the confines of a supposedly unique 
South.  As explanatory or self-satisfying as they may be, these arguments hinder 
attempts to write a new account of the Galveston longshoremen’s strike because they 
leave vital questions unanswered.  A multitude of revisionist studies has emerged in the 
last few decades that confront this outdated historiography.  Challenging head-on many 
of the conclusions reached by their predecessors, the new southern labor historians’ 
compelling arguments and innovative conceptual frameworks offer a solid foundation on 
which to build a fresh study of the strike. 
 New southern labor historians have had little trouble demonstrating the fallacy of 
Texas’s exceptionalism and isolation.  Although they focus primarily on agrarian rather 
than industrial activism, studies of Populism and Socialism have helped to erase the 
imaginary boundaries between the Lone Star State and the rest of the nation.  According 
to Lawrence Goodwyn, the national phenomenon of Populism in the 1890s owed its very 
success to the creation of a distinct “movement culture” in the farmer alliances and 
Granger movements of 1870s Texas.  Goodwyn’s contemporary, James Green, uses this 
same framework to show how ordinary, rural Texans established one of the Southwest’s 
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most energetic Socialist movements of the early twentieth century.  The importance of 
both works lies in their conclusion that the citizenry of Texas played vital roles in larger 
national movements.14  Other scholars more focused on industrial conditions have 
attempted to show the parallels between Texas labor movements and others outside the 
state.  In a revision to his earlier work, F. Ray Marshall concludes that union 
organization initially began among skilled or strategically placed workers and grew at 
much the same pace and in the same places as unions across the nation.  Historian Eric 
Arnesen compares biracial unionism on Galveston’s waterfront with movements in New 
Orleans, Mobile, and Baltimore.  The similarities that he finds help demonstrate the 
falsity of viewing Texas as unique from the rest of the South and the nation.15  
 The new southern labor history has also begun to dispel misleading notions about 
southern strikes and their apparent hopelessness.  In the interests of studying the vital 
center, such arguments led the old southern labor historians to marginalize the dreams 
and expectations of an entire class of southerners.  Unlike modern scholars, the 
Galveston longshoreman, the Birmingham miner, and the Virginia textile worker did not 
have the advantage of hindsight.  They did know, however, about the past and this 
knowledge no doubt disheartened them.  Southern and American history seemed to offer 
them nothing but an endless line of defeats and repression.  In spite of these examples, 
millions of southern workers through the years still chose to walk the picket lines and 
fight hostile employers for better wages and conditions.  Many new scholars embrace the 
audacity and desperation of such workers, arguing that these qualities make their strikes 
more interesting to study than similar conflicts in the North.  “During an era [the 1880s 
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and 1890s] when major labor organizations such as the Amalgamated Association of 
Iron and Steel Workers and the Americans Railway Union failed in their strike activity,” 
historian Mark Wetherington argues, “the efforts of unskilled Savannah black laborers to 
challenge the South’s largest rail system take on additional meaning.”  The South’s 
racist preconceptions and the racial composition of labor movements add an even more 
complicated dimension to these strikes.16
 Unlike their predecessors, new southern labor historians do not dismiss all unions 
as ineffective or the southern working-class as incapable of organization.  Though they 
do not necessarily fall under the category of new southern labor history, Goodwyn and 
Green’s studies both demonstrated that southerners deserve more credit as activists than 
they previously received.  Many other scholars have cited waterfront unionism in New 
Orleans as an important example of such activism.  Even the old southern labor 
historians grudgingly admitted that the Crescent City was an exception to their rule, 
often noting the benefits workers derived from the Democratic political machine.  Much 
to the dismay of business and commercial elites, machine politicians dependent on 
working-class and union votes usually adopted a supportive or hands-off policy toward 
the conflicts of their constituency.  Waterfront labor organizations capitalized on this 
support by pressuring employers to recognize union work rules and wage rates.  
Following a brief period of weakness in the 1890s, labor’s success in New Orleans stood 
unrivalled in the South from the end of the Civil War to the 1920s, and compared 
favorably to labor movements in other American cities.17  Similar studies focusing on 
the mining industry provide even more evidence of strong southern unions.  Much like 
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those in New Orleans, mine unions exerted a significant amount of control over the jobs 
of their members.  Only after employers used racial tensions to their advantage did these 
unions collapse and provide old southern labor historians with support for their 
conclusions.18
 Race and its relationship to class has been a particularly fertile field of inquiry 
for the new historians.19  Many scholars have discovered that the vitality and success of 
southern labor movements depended on their ability to overlook racial prejudices and 
unify black and white workers in pragmatic alliances.  Although not free of controversy, 
the new southern labor history suggests a less monolithic view of African-Americans’ 
relation to white workers and unions.  Acknowledging that exclusionary craft unionism 
dominated the South for most of the twentieth century, these historians have uncovered 
further evidence suggesting strong currents of biracial and interracial unionism in many 
industries.20   
 In his revisionist study of the Alabama coalfields, Daniel Letwin demonstrates 
that black and white workers cooperated through their separate unions and exerted a 
significant amount of job control.  “Chronic, intense, and wide-ranging conflict with 
operators over material conditions and power relations,” Letwin claims, “focused the 
miner’s consciousness in ways that could submerge the divisive capacities of race.”  
Letwin argues further that notions of white supremacy did not prevent unionism, but 
simply imposed limits.  As long as no one attempted to overturn “the social question” of 
segregation, the workers accepted interracial cooperation.  Brian Kelly finds evidence of 
this class solidarity as well, but adds to it the argument that southern employers played 
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“a more fundamental and consistent role in maintaining racial divisions” by using 
segregation as a tool to weaken and tear down labor organization.21
 Because of their long history of unionization and the racial composition of 
southern docks, longshoremen also receive a great deal of attention from new southern 
labor historians interested in examining racial solidarity in the labor movement.  In his 
study of New Orleans dockworkers, Arnesen finds a very strong tradition of biracial 
unionism running from Reconstruction to the 1920s.  He attributes this to two factors: 
the overall strength of African-American longshore unions, which limited white 
workers’ abilities to dominate the labor market, and a political culture receptive to the 
dockworkers’ efforts to unionize.  Through work sharing agreements, united contract 
negotiations, and port-wide work rules and wages, separate white and black unions 
exerted a significant amount of control in New Orleans.22  Ernest Obadele-Starks goes 
even further by offering a radical revision of the old southern labor history that places 
African-Americans at the center of biracial efforts among dockworkers.  Starks argues 
that racism was much more virulent among white longshoremen on the upper Texas Gulf 
Coast than in New Orleans.  As a result, the impetus for cooperation came not from 
whites, but from blacks in the ports of Texas.  Other historians have taken Starks’ 
emphasis on white racism and attempted to revive parts of the old southern labor 
history’s emphasis on race rather than class solidarity.  These scholars argue that 
African-American union members rejected biracialism and cooperative associations with 
racist whites, neither of which dominated anyways, on the grounds of “race-firstism” 
and their pride in being black.  The resulting unions provided blacks with a freedom to 
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act independently that they would not have otherwise enjoyed had they associated with 
whites.23
 Although their subjects vary and their arguments show as much contention as 
those in any historical field, the underlying motivation behind all of these new southern 
labor histories has been to show that the southern labor movement was just as strong and 
occasionally stronger than its counterparts in other areas of America.  Where the old 
labor historians painted themselves and their subjects into a historical corner, this new 
wave of scholars has discarded their reductionism, geographic insularity, and 
misinformed racial assumptions to discover southern workers and their unions for the 
first time.  Their voices reveal a dynamic and nuanced southern labor movement that 
scholars once thought did not exist.   
 Even more essential for the task at hand, the new southern labor histories offer a 
solid conceptual foundation on which to construct a new study of Texas’s most 
important labor dispute of the 1920s.  The Galveston longshoremen’s strike provides a 
unique opportunity to throw off exceptionalist blinders and begin answering larger 
questions that connect organized labor in Texas to more broadly conceived studies of 
American labor history.  Previous studies of the strike do not go far enough in their 
analyses, leaving gaps in the historiography.  First and foremost, this thesis situates the 
longshoremen’s strike within the larger national narrative as an example of business and 
state hostility toward organized labor in the 1920s.  Before the strike ended, this 
atmosphere of antagonism for organized labor resulted in the formation of a powerful 
alliance between Texas business interests and government officials in Austin dedicated 
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to breaking union power.  Governor Hobby’s declaration of martial law in June 1920 
was the most visible manifestation of this alliance.  Requested by a committee of 
businessmen, the military occupation of Galveston imposed anti-labor open-shop 
policies on the city.  The legislature’s passage of the Open Port Law in October 1920 
provided even more evidence of this growing hostility.  Proposed by Governor Hobby 
and championed by state businessmen, the bill effectively outlawed labor strikes in 
several key industries.  This study argues that such methods fit a pattern of labor 
repression that characterized United State labor relations following World War I and on 
through the 1920s.  
 In addition to this main argument, the pages that follow also examine two themes 
in more detail.  As it does in any labor conflict, the public’s attitude toward the strike 
and its participants played an important role in determining its outcome.  Focusing 
primarily on businessmen and elites, previous scholars have argued or implied that most 
Galvestonians opposed the strike because it damaged public interests.  Using many of 
the same sources, this study argues that middle and lower class Galvestonians responded 
to the events of the strike more ambiguously than these old southern labor historians 
would allow.  Rather than blindly accept the leadership of Galveston’s powerful business 
interests and aristocratic families, local merchants, municipal officers, and ordinary 
citizens frequently demonstrated their disapproval of the high-handed methods used 
throughout the strike.  Although the motives of these classes differed, each exhibited at 
least indirect support for the cause of organized labor.  Their actions suggest that a great 
many southerners did not always hold “progress” in as high regard as some of these 
 
 18
older historians once argued.24  
 The second theme analyzes the relation between the racially segregated 
longshore locals and their black and white members during the strike.  Borrowing 
heavily from the arguments of Arnesen and Letwin, the evidence suggests a brief but 
rather intense instance of biracial solidarity between the segregated longshoremen in 
response to the use of Mexican and African-American strikebreakers.  In spite of this 
cooperation, the shipping companies eventually used the race question to divide the 
strikers and end the conflict on open-shop terms.  Contrary to prevailing notions of Jim 
Crow social acceptability, the shipping companies’ open-shop policy of non-
discrimination in hiring temporarily worked for rather than against black longshoremen.  
The companies forced Galveston’s dominant white workers to either submit to racial 
integration on the docks, or find work elsewhere, and in the process, incurred the public 
wrath once more. 
 To fulfill its objectives, this study relies heavily on primary research, especially 
contemporary newspapers and labor journals, and archival resources.  In order to 
minimize the bias and emotion often seen in newspaper accounts of local events, both 
local and non-local papers are examined extensively, especially the Galveston Daily 
News, the Houston Post, and the Houston Press.  Secondary sources set the stage for this 
primary research, providing origins and background information, as well as conceptual 
frameworks on which to base less concrete aspects of the strike, such as race.  This study 
begins by examining political and economic conditions in Galveston and Texas during 
the early twentieth century to discover their effect on organized labor.  Chapter II 
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includes brief histories of waterfront organization in Galveston, including the 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association (SBA) and the ILA, and early confrontations 
between capital and labor in Galveston.  The third chapter looks at the early days of the 
strike, starting with the events that led up to it and a brief description of longshore work.  
The attitudes of Galveston’s various economic classes toward the striking longshoremen 
also receive treatment.  This chapter concludes in early June 1920 by looking at a few 
early instances of strike-related violence and the effect that this had on the declaration of 
martial law. 
 Chapter IV looks at the administration of martial law as established by Governor 
Hobby and Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters.  Besides presenting the most revealing 
evidence of a business-state alliance directed against organized labor, this chapter also 
helps reveal the ordinary Galvestonian’s attitude toward organized labor and its 
antagonists.  Chapter IV concludes with an examination of some of the National Guard’s 
less constructive actions, including numerous accidents and examples of repression, 
which eventually led to the withdrawal of troops from the city in October 1920. 
The fifth chapter examines the issue of race in the Galveston strike and the 
efforts of the segregated coastwise locals to work together in the era of Jim Crow.  It 
begins by looking at instances of biracial solidarity in the strike, especially in connection 
to the employment of Mexican strikebreakers on the Mallory line docks.  Chapter V 
proceeds through the end of the strike in December 1920 and February 1921, when the 
shipping companies invoked the open-shop principle of non-discrimination in hiring to 
divide the segregated locals and break the strike.  This leads into the sixth and final 
 
 20
chapter, which details the aftermath and effects of the strike, beginning with the passage 
of the Open Port Law in October 1920.  This incident provides final evidence of the 
devastation caused by the strike and its impact on the subsequent history of Texas.  
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CHAPTER II 
DISCOVERING ALLIES AND ENEMIES 
 Home to the state’s very first and most powerful unions, Galveston exemplified 
the trends of Texas’s historically-successful labor movement.  The success of 
unionization in the Island City stood unmatched in the South, due in no small part to its 
most important group of workers, the longshoremen.  Through their efforts, the port 
became one of the most strongly unionized in the country—only the waterfronts of New 
York and New Orleans surpassed it.  Occasionally, this strength translated into state and 
local political victories.  While organizations like the Texas State Federation of Labor 
extracted progressive legislation and reforms from Austin lawmakers, labor-friendly 
politicians in Galveston fought the selfish interests of local aristocrats and their business 
allies.  Although exaggerated, the belief of many contemporaries that Galveston 
belonged to the longshoreman contained some truth. 
 In spite of its political strength, organized labor could not overcome the 
economic effects of World War I in Texas.  Dragged into a statewide depression, 
Galveston’s dockworkers suffered unemployment, low wages, and dizzying inflation 
throughout the war.  When the armistice ended this downturn, the longshoremen hoped 
their wartime political advances would help provide working Galvestonians with a 
greater share of the wealth they produced.  Much to their dissatisfaction, however, local 
employers entertained other ideas about the economic future.  Supported by state 
political leaders, open-shop advocates, and a growing national hostility to unions, local 
shipping companies charted a course to destroy Galveston’s waterfront labor movement. 
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*  *  *  * 
 The state of Texas thrived in 1920.  Texans were extremely proud of their high 
agricultural production and the national prestige it bestowed on their home.  Although its 
crown had begun to tarnish, King Cotton stood behind much of this economic progress.  
From 1900 to 1920, the cotton crop in Texas accounted for fully one quarter of the 
nation’s total production.1  Increased quantities of wheat, rice, and sugar cane 
supplemented this growth.2  More than agriculture explained the state’s prosperity, 
though.   In the early twentieth century, Texas also began expanding its industrial sector.  
The first moves in this direction occurred in the Piney Woods of East Texas, where the 
timber industry grew significantly.  Led by the increased demand for lumber and 
building materials that accompanied the migration from the countryside to the cities, 
Texas controlled 5.5 percent of the national timber market by 1907.3  The most 
significant advance in the Texas industrial economy came in 1901, when the Spindletop 
gusher inaugurated the state’s legendary oil boom.  The drilling and refining industry 
that ensued catapulted the state into national economic prominence.  By 1921, Texas’s 
industrial output exceeded the value of its agricultural production.4
   Galveston played a major role in bringing about this statewide prosperity.  
Although it ranked as only the sixth largest city in Texas, Galveston was by far the most 
important shipping center in the state.  In 1920, the port exported $637.5 million in cargo 
and imported $30.9 million, up from $464.2 million and $17.7 million the year before.  
The first year of the new decade also saw 400,000 more bales of cotton pass over the 
city’s docks than in 1919.  Out of forty-nine United States ports reporting, Galveston 
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ranked second in total tonnage, eighth in exports, and eleventh in imports.5  Along with 
cotton and consumer goods, tourists and beachgoers also poured into the city.  As the 
decade progressed, the economy of Galveston relied more and more heavily on tourism 
and its beachfront resort status.  With its lax liquor laws and widespread gambling, the 
self-proclaimed “Playground of Texas” became one of the state’s most popular 
destinations in the self-indulgent decade after World War I.6   
 In spite of its economically-sound position at the start of the decade, Galveston’s 
fortunes had not always been so bright.  Events earlier in the twentieth century nearly 
destroyed the port’s business and the city itself.  As everyone living along the Gulf Coast 
knows, hurricanes constantly threaten the area.  To this day, the Great Storm of 1900 
remains the most legendary of these.  This massive hurricane nearly removed the city 
from future maps.  The shifting sandbar that is Galveston Island offered its inhabitants 
little protection from the fury of nature.  Besides killing several thousand local residents, 
the storm caused millions of dollars in property damage to the island and its port.  
Together with the privately-owned Galveston Wharf Company and its allied business 
interests, ordinary Galvestonians quickly placed their city back on its feet after this 
terrible tragedy, most notably through the construction of the island’s massive seawall.  
Nature continued to wreak havoc, however, and smaller storms in 1908 and 1915 had 
similar, if less catastrophic results.  The publicity these tempests received from state and 
national media did not make Galveston an attractive prospect for businessmen hoping to 
protect their investments.7  “Galveston’s fate,” argued a local historian, “was shaped by 
technology, location, and human reason.  It was too risky, too reckless, and too 
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uneconomic [sic] to place extensive businesses or population on an unstable edge of 
nature.”8
 The years of World War I also damaged the city’s economy.  Unlike most areas 
of the country, Texas fell into an economic slump during the war.  As the nation’s 
political situation grew more uncertain, so did the state’s economy.  In some skilled 
professions, unemployment rates skyrocketed as high as 55 percent.  Despite “Buy-It-
Made-In-Texas” campaigns designed to create new jobs and local industry, Texas 
workers continued to suffer.  Galvestonians began to feel the effects of this depression in 
1916.  Wanting to be closer to the European theatre and the established industrial centers 
of the Northeast and Great Lakes region, shipping companies left the Gulf Coast and 
concentrated their business in various Atlantic ports.  The port of Galveston languished 
and its deep sea and coastwise shipping fell to drastically reduced levels.  Thousands of 
unemployed Galvestonians found themselves without means of support during these 
inflationary years.9   
 As millions celebrated peace in November 1918, Galveston’s shipping industry 
and state businessmen simply hoped for a brighter future.  The import and export totals 
for 1920 indicate that they did not have to wait long before realizing this wish.  To their 
relief, the brief postwar economic depression that engulfed the nation overlooked both 
the state and its premier port.10  This bust and boom cycle impacted the attitudes of 
Texas’s business interests significantly.  Unwilling to repeat the economic disaster of the 
war years, their number one concern became sustaining the newfound prosperity.  The 
question on everyone’s mind was at whose expense. 
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*  *  *  * 
 Organized labor also welcomed the return of better days to the state.  In 
Galveston, no one was happier than the longshoremen.  The hard times of World War I 
represented a low point in their historically high fortunes.  Most scholars know of the 
role played by Texans in the agrarian revolts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  There has been much written about the Farmer’s Alliance, Populism, and 
agrarian Socialism in Texas.11  Fewer people, however, know of organized labor’s 
lengthy history in the state, especially in Galveston.  Through their unions, the workers 
of Texas achieved a degree of power that matched many of the nation’s most strongly 
organized cities and industries. 
 Prior to the Civil War, the labor movement in Texas followed a pattern seen 
across the nation.  Workers in Texas could not boast of any energetic labor activism 
because none existed outside of a few scattered ethnic benevolent societies.  In 1857, 
Houston and Galveston led the state’s first attempts to form a comprehensive 
workingmen’s mutual aid association.   Due to the general lack of industry, a scattered 
workforce, and widespread distrust of labor organizations as “Yankee innovations,” such 
early efforts failed and severely retarded union growth during the antebellum period.12  
Soon after the end of the war, this situation changed.  Much like their counterparts 
throughout the country, skilled workers in the South began organizing their crafts.13   
 In Texas, the efforts began on the Galveston docks with a small group of 
specialized workers known as screwmen.  Wielding large jackscrews, these laborers 
compressed and stowed bales of cotton within the holds of ships.  A good gang of 
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screwmen could “jam” up to 15 percent more cotton than a gang of regular hand loaders.  
Because the profitability of a voyage depended entirely on how many bales they loaded, 
southern shippers relied heavily on these skilled men.  Galveston’s white screwmen 
recognized the value of their craft, and in October 1866, they formed Texas’s first and 
most successful labor union of the nineteenth century, the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association (SBA).14  
 As the name suggests, the SBA began as a mutual benefit society.  An inherently 
conservative association, it showed little concern for improving working conditions or 
relieving class conflict throughout its early years.  Instead, the SBA created a sense of 
fraternity among its exclusive membership, organizing social activities, purchasing 
elaborate uniforms, and providing sickness and death benefits.  In response to greater 
competition from black screwmen, who formed the Colored Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Society (CSBA) in 1883, the SBA adopted a doctrine of “pure and simple” unionism 
designed to improve its members’ economic fortunes.  After amending its constitution 
and creating more lenient entrance policies, the SBA’s membership grew substantially.  
With these new numbers and the leverage they provided, the organized screwmen began 
making greater demands on the shipping companies to insure that their black 
competition did not undercut them.  The skill of its members and their position in the 
port allowed the SBA to quickly exert a significant amount of control over work rules, 
hours, general conditions, hiring, and pay.15
 Throughout the rest of the century, the SBA maintained a great deal of this 
power, not to mention the goodwill of most Galvestonians.  To reassure the latter of its 
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members’ loyalty, the union strictly observed two policies: the maintenance of strict 
neutrality in the political affairs of the community, and the policing of its members’ 
activities away from the docks.  The SBA employed both strategies to guard against 
behavior that might tarnish the union’s image in the eyes of a public still wary of labor 
organizations.  Besides forbidding religious and political figures from addressing their 
meetings, the aristocratic SBA also refused to affiliate with other longshore unions or 
city-wide labor assemblies.  On the few occasions that the screwmen reached across job 
lines, their cooperation only lasted briefly.  In 1883, for example, the SBA helped form 
the City Trade and Labor Assembly, but when the new organization began calling for 
such controversial actions as a strike fund and the endorsement of political candidates, 
the screwmen quickly dissolved their connection.16  In spite of its official political 
aloofness, the SBA still commanded considerable attention in city affairs.  Local 
politicians, most of whom had financial interests in the shipping and cotton industries, 
could not ignore the SBA and the potential profits its members controlled.  This indirect 
influence made the screwmen a very powerful force in the early history of Galveston and 
Texas labor. 
 The SBA’s apolitical nature notwithstanding, labor disputes occasionally struck 
the Galveston waterfront in the nineteenth century.  One particularly violent episode 
took place in 1898, when black longshoremen of Federal Labor Union No. 7147 walked 
off their jobs at the Mallory docks demanding higher wages.  In the conflict that 
followed, the company imported strikebreakers along with a company of artillery from 
Houston to protect them.  After several instances of violence, including one in which the 
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mayor and police shot and killed a striker and an innocent bystander, the union men 
returned to work without realizing their wage demands.  The dead bystander, Thomas H. 
Baker, was a longtime member of the SBA.  His funeral procession brought together not 
only the SBA, but also the majority of the city’s approximately fifteen hundred white 
and black longshoremen.17  The incident illustrated the growing strength and solidarity 
of the Galveston longshore unions.  Labor activists and unions across the country would 
have found their pattern of action and the subsequent reaction by authorities familiar.  
 The early twentieth century represented a major turning point for organized labor 
in Galveston and Texas.  Surprisingly, the continuing expansion of the cotton industry 
throughout the final years of the nineteenth century actually hurt the SBA.  Although its 
entrance qualifications became more lenient as the years progresses, the union’s 
membership remained low.  This made it unable to provide enough men during the busy 
seasons.  Constrained by its numbers and facing greater competition from the CSBA and 
independent longshoremen, the screwmen began losing control over their craft.  Much 
the same as in countless other trades, technology finally sealed the fate of the SBA.  
Early in the century, shipping companies introduced the high-density cotton press and 
large steel steamships into the industry.  Both “advances” made the screwman’s skilled 
labor superfluous and steadily undermined his privileged position on the docks.  By 
1902, the changing situation forced the SBA to give up its long-cherished independence 
and affiliate with a new force in the Galveston labor movement, the International 
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA).18
 In 1877, an Irish immigrant named Dan Keefe founded the ILA on the docks of 
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Chicago.  Instead of practicing the craft autonomy found in most nineteenth century 
labor unions, Keefe quickly moved toward industrial unionization, organizing semi-
skilled black and white longshoremen throughout the ports of the Great Lakes and East 
Coast.  In 1900, the ILA issued its first Texas charter to the general longshoremen of 
Galveston, who became Local 310.  Aided by the creation of overarching organizations 
such as the Galveston Dock and Marine Council, the ILA quickly gained strength 
throughout the port.  Although it remained fiercely independent, the weakening position 
of the SBA forced it to join the international as Local 317 several years later.  Following 
this, black screwmen chartered Locals 329 and 851, in 1911 and 1913, respectively.  
According to the Maud Russell, a historian of the ILA, the white Southern Pacific 
longshoremen in Local 385 had “the largest local in the South and probably one of the 
largest in the country.”19  With its high membership and commitment to the organization 
of black and white workers, the ILA spread rapidly to other ports in Texas and the 
South, but Galveston’s status as the most organized Gulf port made it the jewel in the 
union’s southern crown.  When the ILA decided to form a South Atlantic and Gulf Coast 
District 1911, it chose Galveston as its new headquarters, evidence that the union highly 
valued the city.20  Though the port has since declined in importance, this symbolic proof 
of Galveston’s historical significance to the labor movement is still located on the Strand 
just two blocks from the waterfront.   
 The hiring method practiced on the Galveston docks provides another significant 
indication of the union’s strength.  Due to the infrequent nature of longshore work, most 
companies in the early twentieth century only employed longshoremen by the day.  
 
 34
When ships finally made port, most hiring took place by means of the infamous “shape 
up.”  As hundreds of men “shaped up” in a crude semicircle at the head of each dock, the 
foreman, usually employed directly by the company or a stevedoring firm, proceeded to 
choose however many he thought necessary for working the vessel.  Because this 
individual maintained total control over the entire process, hiring remained arbitrary and 
subject to corruption long into the twentieth century.21  On the docks of Galveston, 
employers used a different method of employment.  As in most other Texas ports, the 
railroads and their allied shipping companies in the city employed regular freight 
handlers.  Instead of the casual shape up, Lester Rubin argues that the ILA “controlled 
hiring and saw fit to rotate the gangs assigned to work to insure that the work was spread 
evenly among all members.”  This system of employment produced the first “de-
casualized” ports in the nation and demonstrated the considerable power enjoyed by the 
longshoremen’s unions within the port of Galveston.22
 The general state of the labor movement in Texas during the early twentieth 
century also aided the ILA along the Gulf Coast.  One of the most important advances 
for organized labor occurred with the formation of the Texas State Federation of Labor 
(TSFL).  Created in 1900 at Cleburne, a town whose place in the history of working 
class activism is well known to scholars of Populism, the TSFL fought to improve the 
plight of workers through labor reforms.  The twenty-three original delegates of the 
Federation brought together farm groups, organized labor, and various middle-class 
elements into a progressive alliance that affected a great deal of positive change.  
Although affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the TSFL eschewed its 
 
 35
parent organization’s voluntarism in favor of a more politically active platform 
reminiscent of the Knights of Labor.23   
 In January 1903, this progressive mentality culminated in the creation of the 
Federation’s Joint Labor Legislation Board.  Through this new board, the TSFL 
essentially became a political lobbying group for the workingmen and women of the 
state.  The Federation supported typically progressive measures, such as laws limiting 
child and convict labor and regulation of working hours and safety conditions.  Of 
particular significance to the state’s longshoremen, the TSFL-sponsored “Spider Bill,” 
named for the foreign objects frequently found in cotton bales, protected their hands 
from “metal ties, buckles, bands, and splices.”  The board also kept a watchful eye on 
Texas legislators, publishing their voting records for all working people to see.  
Dockworkers could point with pride to the presidency of the Federation, occupied from 
1907 to 1910 by a longshoreman from ILA Local 307 in Galveston, J.H. Fricke.  Until 
about 1910, a receptive and progressive legislature hostile toward non-native industries 
helped the TSFL achieve many of its goals.24
  The second decade of the twentieth century witnessed the first major setbacks 
for Texas’s historically sound labor movement.  Beginning in 1911, a succession of anti-
labor governors and less-than-friendly legislators entered the capitol building in Austin. 
The TSFL’s influence declined dramatically as a result.25  World War I did little to 
alleviate these growing problems.  Contrary to those who cite the era as a “Golden Age” 
for unionization and the American working class, the war hurt Texas labor, especially in 
Galveston.  Scholars that view 1914-1918 as a watershed for unions usually point for 
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evidence to the accomplishments of Woodrow Wilson.   The president’s desire to 
maintain high production and a vigorous war effort led him into a close alliance with the 
labor movement administration.  In late 1917, the longshoremen of the nation gained 
what appeared to be a powerful ally when the administration created the National 
Adjustment Commission (NAC) to deal with labor problems on the nation’s wharves.26  
In Galveston, however, the statewide economic slump meant that dockworkers had no 
jobs to defend with this newfound political voice.  On the occasions that the NAC 
managed to successfully arbitrate grievances for Texas’s dockworkers, their employers 
usually sidestepped the most onerous provisions.  Holding this power, many 
businessmen begin hiring women and children at reduced wages once again.  The 
vicious oil field strike that began in November 1917 cured many of the illusion that 
capital and labor could work together in Texas.  When the war ended a year later, the 
government-union alliance collapsed almost overnight.  As the war agencies faltered and 
failed, organized labor—in Texas and throughout the country—quickly realized that the 
future contained many bitter days.27   
*  *  *  * 
 In spite of the seemingly ominous economic horizon, Galveston labor continued 
to enjoy a good deal of local political influence after World War I.  To understand this 
requires a brief trip back to the turn of the century and an explanation of the city’s 
municipal government.  In the aftermath of the 1900 hurricane, a group called the Deep 
Water Committee (DWC) proposed rewriting the city’s charter and doing away with the 
city council form of government then in place.  Created in 1882 to promote harbor 
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improvements, the elite-controlled DWC had a vested interest in the recovery of 
Galveston’s commercial operations.  After a short battle, voters accepted the “Galveston 
Plan” and watched the establishment of a new commission form of government.  Instead 
of a mayor and city council representing local citizens of different precincts, five city 
commissioners elected at-large every two years ran the city.  In addition to the mayor, 
the charter created separate commissioners for finance and revenue, police and fire, 
waterworks and sewerage, and streets and public improvements.28   
 Although on paper the commission form of government appeared to be more 
egalitarian than its predecessor, Galvestonians quickly learned that practice does not 
always follow theory.  Each commissioner gained legislative and executive powers in his 
area, but because they had no obligation to cooperate with their colleagues, the new 
government operated rather inefficiently.  The creation of a complicated and 
unproductive municipal government by a city hoping to regain its footing seems 
counterproductive at first sight.  The motive behind this decision, however, becomes 
clear when considering the affiliations of the DWC—over half the members of this 
committee maintained ties to the powerful and privately-owned Galveston Wharf and 
Cotton Press Company.29   
 Established under the leadership of wealthy entrepreneurs in 1854, the Wharf 
Company enjoyed a virtual monopoly on all port activities.  By 1860, the Company 
owned seven of Galveston’s ten wharves and controlled all local tariffs and port fees.  
With little regard for the city or its ordinary citizens, its directors frequently raised or 
lowered these duties in order to benefit themselves and their investors.  Recalling the 
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national railroad scandals of previous decades, many Texans began labeling the 
Company the “Octopus of the Gulf.”  Thomas Barker maintains that the history of the 
corporation “became one” with the city following the storm.30  With this history no 
doubt in mind, many residents saw through the Company’s apparent altruism and 
recognized the new government as another attempt to control Galveston.  The city 
commission stood as the culmination of the local business aristocracy’s divide-and-
conquer strategy.  One contemporary Galvestonian argued that the commission 
“constituted an attempt by upper-class, advanced professional and large business groups 
to take formal political power from the previously dominant lower- and middle-class 
elements that they might advance their own conceptions of desirable public policy.”31
 How then did organized labor and its working class membership benefit from 
this arrangement?  By the time of the war, cracks began appearing in the city 
government as the commissioners, not all of whom had economic interests in the 
waterfront, came into conflict with the Wharf Company over financial matters.  In 1917, 
Isaac H. Kempner and George Sealy won the positions of mayor and commissioner for 
finance and revenue.  Representing Galveston’s leading families, both Kempner and 
Sealy had strong ties to the DWC and Wharf Company.  Filled with the progressive 
spirit of the time and unwilling to endure the dominance of private interests any longer, 
several groups came together and challenged these aristocrats.  Calling themselves the 
City Party, an independent ticket of candidates temporarily broke the Company’s 
stranglehold on the citizenry by defeating Kempner and Sealy in 1919.  With the 
approval of local voters, the City Party successfully amended the municipal charter in 
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May 1920.  The new document included such progressive provisions as recall of city 
officials, eminent domain, and authorization for the city government to purchase and sell 
up to two-thirds of the Wharf Company’s total value.  According to the pro-business 
Galveston Daily News, the charter amendments met with greatest favor in the precincts 
occupied by laboring men.  In a statement made two months later, the popular 
commission argued that their electoral reversal abolished special privilege in the city.  
They increased tax revenue at the expense of under-assessed corporations, firms, and 
wealthy individuals, while eliminating taxes on sewerage and lowering streetcar prices.  
In this rebellious atmosphere, at-large elections provided dockworkers and their fellow 
workingmen a significant amount of leverage in city politics.  In the hands of the City 
Party, Galveston’s municipal government became a friend of the working class.32
 Despite the local support it commanded in 1920, organized labor met a less 
congenial reception in state politics.  The progressive days of the century’s first decade 
had long since passed.  “A more tolerant attitude toward corporate enterprise marked 
Texas society after the war,” argued historian Lewis Gould.  “Businessmen responded to 
the doctrines of cooperation that the war fostered and supported the burgeoning 
Chamber of Commerce movement,” thus tying the prosperity of state and local 
governments to their own.  The business community’s constant attacks on the Texas 
Industrial Welfare Commission indicated the growing hostility toward labor activism.  
Two years after the creation of this progressive agency, the 1921 legislative session 
repealed the law creating it and deprived workers of a potentially useful ally.33   
 Distraction with other issues partly explains this ambivalence toward the plight 
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of workers in the state.  Since the turn of the century, a significant number of Texas 
Democrats had joined their southern neighbors in the moral crusade for prohibition.  
Writing to the governor in 1905, T.W. Carlock stated that “the position of public men 
upon the question has invited or repelled their following more than their view upon all 
other questions combined: when the issue becomes acute it dominates every other 
issue.”34  The enactment of national prohibition in January 1920 allowed Texas’s 
crusaders to solidify their position, but the issue continued to fester.  The issue had 
particular significance in Galveston since the city’s status as a pleasure destination lent 
itself to the unimpeded flow of intoxicating beverages.  Although there is no direct 
evidence, the connection traditionally made between workers and alcohol consumption 
may have adversely effected the image of Galveston’s longshoremen.  Rather than 
diverting the attention of state officials, prohibition may have actually served to focus 
greater concern on the proverbially drunken longshoremen of Galveston.35
 Creating an even greater diversion, the “Invisible Empire” of the Ku Klux Klan 
reappeared in Texas at the Confederate Veterans Parade of October 1920.  By the spring 
of 1921, organizers established local Klans throughout southeast Texas, including one in 
Galveston.   As the Klan gained strength and ventured into politics, their emphasis on 
“100 percent Americanism” and the promotion of Anglo-Saxon Protestant morality 
distracted further attention from the plight of organized labor in the 1920s.  Further 
complicating matters, the Klan continually expressed its hostility toward the labor 
movement.  The industrial unionism and race-mixing practiced by the ILA did not leave 
a favorable impression on the organized longshoremen’s white-hooded opponents.36    
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 The growing atmosphere of anti-labor sentiment seen across the nation after 
World War I only added to these political problems.  After offering its military aid to 
crush the massive steel and coal strikes of 1919, the federal government led the charge in 
a new and intensely repressive Red Scare aimed at working-class activism.  Soon, even 
the most conservative unions found themselves under scrutiny for any trace of 
radicalism.  Such investigations made it obvious to workers that their employers and 
one-time allies in Washington had already begun to forget their friendly wartime attitude 
toward the labor movement.  The revitalization of open-shop doctrines in 1919, 
euphemistically renamed the “American Plan” by its business sponsors, eventually 
proved even more serious.  Organized labor quickly recognized the unity and 
commitment that open-shop advocates had to breaking the American worker’s tenuous 
power.  This new force made its first appearance in Texas during the fall of 1919; by the 
time the strike began, its anti-union ideology had spread into most of Texas’s largest 
cities.37  The wartime marriage of labor, business, and government soon gave way to a 
decade of bitter struggles for control of the American workplace. 
*  *  *  * 
 As they stepped into the 1920s, organized labor and the business interests of 
Galveston found themselves in an ambiguous position.  At the local level, labor seemed 
to enjoy an advantage politically.  Lined up against the unions, Galveston’s shipping 
interests possessed powerful, if slightly distracted allies of their own in the state and 
national capitals.  Economically, both groups hoped for better days in the wake of 
wartime depression.  The longshoremen fully expected that mediation commissions such 
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as the NAC would help maintain this prosperity to the benefit of both employer and 
employee, but local and state businessmen had other plans.  Only by weakening 
organized labor and silencing its newfound political voice could they guarantee their 
future economic success.  To even the casual observer, a showdown between these 
antagonistic forces of capital and labor seemed inevitable.  The final split occurred on 
March 19, 1920, when sixteen hundred longshoremen walked off Galveston’s docks 
demanding an increase in wages.  The watershed struggle that ensued eventually 
revealed who would control Texas’s economic fortunes for the remainder of the decade.  
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CHAPTER III 
UNFULFILLED PROMISES  
 As memories of the wartime depression began fading in March 1920, organized 
labor optimistically expected its alliance with government and business to continue into 
the new decade.  The role labor played in the victory over German forces seemed to 
secure its recent gains.  When the Galveston longshoremen’s strike began later that 
month, most of the longshoremen believed that the existence of mediation boards like 
the National Adjustment Commission (NAC) and their contributions to the war effort 
would help bring about a quick and amiable resolution.  In spite of these hopes, the men 
soon realized that their employers’ stubbornness and the impotency of wartime labor 
boards stood in the way of the outcome they desired.  Although the members of Locals 
385 and 807 enjoyed the support of many traditionally-minded Galvestonians, the 
shipping companies and their business allies intended to force a showdown with 
organized labor.  The bitter and sometimes violent conflict that ensued indicated to the 
longshoremen that whatever visions their employers had for the future, it did not include 
them or their unions. 
*  *  *  * 
 Although many viewed theirs as an unskilled profession, longshoremen had a 
dangerous and physically demanding job that required a great deal of competence.  On-
the-job injuries and deaths occurred all too often on the country’s docks.  Many of the 
worst accidents happened around open hatches, where a longshoreman might fall or be 
crushed to death by improperly loaded or swinging cargo.  Extremely long work hours 
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and the shipping companies’ lack of concern for safety precautions caused most of these 
incidents.  Because the profitability of a journey depended on how much time a ship 
spent in port, the nation’s longshoremen usually worked extremely long hours.  In his 
classic study of the New York longshore industry, Charles Barnes stated that 
longshoremen often worked continuously from fifteen to forty hours, barely receiving 
time enough to eat, let alone sleep.  This concern for profit offered little incentive for 
companies to provide safety measures that might slow the process of loading or 
unloading.  The longshoremen suffered from this calculation—53 percent died between 
the ages of thirty-five and fifty-four, as compared to just 34 percent in all other 
occupations.1  
 Besides accidents, the profession proved detrimental to physical health in other 
ways as well.  For men loading 300 pound bags of sugar and 500 pound bales of cotton, 
fatigue was constant.  Since the job required them to work outdoors in all types of 
weather conditions, longshoremen had a high risk of becoming sick.  Those working 
between damp docks and refrigerated ships or handling easily airborne cargo (grain or 
cement, for example) frequently fell victim to ailments such as pneumonia and 
tuberculosis.  In Texas, weather conditions often affected the comfort of dockworkers.  
Anyone living along the Gulf Coast knows how oppressive the humidity and heat can be 
after a summer shower.  The near tropical atmosphere quickly became unbearable in the 
poorly ventilated hold of steel steamships.  In their relentless drive for profit, many 
shipping companies even refused to provide drinking water under such circumstances.  
Instead, the foreman deducted a small sum of money from the men’s paychecks, usually 
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a nickel or dime for each day worked, in exchange for a community bucket of ice water.2
 If asked to name the worst characteristic of their industry in the early twentieth 
century, most dockworkers would have answered the infrequency of work.  Because of 
their connection to the unpredictable schedules of ocean-going vessels, longshoremen 
accepted a certain amount of casualness in their daily work schedules, regularly 
interspersed with long periods of unemployment.  Although the replacement of the 
sailing vessel with the steamship made regularly scheduled voyages more predictable, 
casual work continued to plague the professional longshoreman.  The arbitrariness of 
hiring under the shape-up system did nothing to alleviate this.  Even in ports like 
Galveston where longshore unions enjoyed a voice in employment decisions, men did 
not receive paychecks when the port contained no ships.  A general oversupply of labor 
only added to this problem.  Although certain aspects of the job required knowledge and 
skill, a person only truly needed physical strength to perform longshore work.  Hard 
times usually attracted laborers from other occupations, providing more competition for 
professional longshoremen already hard pressed to make ends meet.3    
 Casualness had two important effects on dockworkers.  First, social 
commentators and scholars frequently characterized the longshoreman as a lazy, 
immoral drunkard unwilling to hold steady employment.  In order to obtain work, the 
longshoreman spent lengthy hours loafing about in shabby waterfront districts waiting 
for new ships to arrive.  Observed by less penetrating eyes, such necessary behavior 
invited the formation of unsavory stereotypes.4  No doubt some of the men embraced 
this reputation, but most simply ignored it.  They could not, however, overlook the effect 
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that casual work had on their earnings.  Even though longshoremen received relatively 
high wages compared to other unskilled laborers, the infrequency of work and long 
periods of unemployment made it difficult for them to earn a decent living.  On the 
docks of New York, the average wage of $0.33 an hour in 1914 compared favorably to 
that received by unionized machinists, but the infrequency of work resulted in weekly 
paychecks smaller than that of a common steel-mill laborer.5  The president of ILA 
Local 385, O.A. Anderson, confirmed this difficulty in the first days of the Galveston 
strike, stating that “the wages we received would not be so bad if the work was steady, 
but as it is, we only work about four days a week and we do not make enough to live 
on.”  Rising inflation, which plagued the nation during and after World War I, did little 
to alleviate this problem.6
 While Galveston’s longshoremen struggled to regain their economic footing after 
the recent wartime slump, waterfront workers across the country found themselves 
sliding into a postwar depression.  Casual work, unemployment, and low earnings only 
made such times more trying.  All of these problems finally reached their breaking point 
in March 1920.   Following the example set by thousands of New York dockworkers, 
coastwise longshoremen in almost every major port from Boston to the Rio Grande took 
action and walked off their jobs.  This mass rebellion of labor represented the 
culmination of a half year’s worth of frustration and failed negotiation on the part of the 
country’s coastwise dockworkers.   
 The final descent into industrial conflict began on September 19, 1919.  At a 
meeting held in New Orleans, various southern locals of the ILA met in New Orleans 
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and formulated wage demands which they intended to present to their companies.  One 
week later, the individual unions contacted their stevedores, contractors, and steamship 
lines, giving them fifteen days to comply with the new demands.  In Galveston, union 
representatives from Locals 385 and 807 presented the Morgan-Southern Pacific and 
Mallory steamship lines with a demand for an increase in wages from $0.60 to $0.80 
straight time and $0.90 to $1.20 overtime.  At the request of the companies and their 
affiliates, the longshoremen agreed to place the matter before a hearing of the NAC, to 
take place in New Orleans from October 28 to November 1.7   
 The year 1919 was a period of transition for the NAC.  Although created to 
function for the duration of the war only, the commission’s success in mediating 
longshore labor disputes convinced officials in Washington to reorganize it on a 
permanent basis during peacetime.  Just prior to the longshoremen’s September meeting 
they achieved this goal, but reorganization remained incomplete.  Neither the United 
States Railroad Administration, which controlled most of the country’s coastwise lines 
during the war, nor the remaining private coastwise lines would agree to become parties 
in the reconstructed NAC.  This refusal had an important impact on the outcome of the 
New Orleans meeting.  Although all classes of longshoremen sent representatives to the 
hearing, the commission could only reach wage settlements for those engaged in deep 
sea operations.  This adjustment included cotton screwmen, general longshoremen, and 
timbermen, but not the country’s coastwise longshoremen.8  Instead, the commission 
passed the buck and told the coastwise representatives it did not have time to consider 
their demands, but would meet again as soon as possible to reopen the matter.9
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 The hearing and its outcome quickly became a point of conflict among the 
nation’s coastwise longshoremen.  Wage parity with the traditionally higher paid deep 
sea longshoremen had long been a demand of the coastwise workers, and during the war, 
many achieved this.  The NAC meeting, however, once again created wage differentials 
between the different classes of longshoremen.  Depending on the port, this disparity 
ranged from $0.15 to $0.30 an hour.  Having become accustomed to wage equality, the 
coastwise men saw this as an injustice that required remediation as quickly as possible.  
Most were understandably excited when the NAC followed through on its recent 
promise and convened a second adjustment meeting in Washington, D.C. from 
December 5 to 6.10   
 This optimism quickly turned into disappointment and anger upon their arrival in 
the national capital.  Almost immediately, the commission informed the union 
representatives of the coastwise shipping companies’ refusal to enter official 
negotiations.  Instead, the meeting would be nothing more than an informal wage 
conference between the parties and its decisions neither final nor binding.  This 
impotency carried over into the meeting’s outcome.  The shipping companies agreed to 
raise wages only if the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) first granted them an 
increase in freight rates.  Much to labor’s dismay, the ICC denied this request and the 
longshoremen returned to their home ports “having been given the regularly prescribed 
dose of promises that something would soon be done.”11
 As the holidays came and went, both the NAC and the shipping companies 
refused to address the coastwise longshoremen’s grievances.  With their patience 
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beginning to wear thin, various coastwise locals wired ILA president T.V. O’Connor on 
January 15, 1920 with a threat to strike if the NAC did not take action within ten days.  
Hoping to call the locals’ bluff, the NAC waited until the January 25 deadline to issue a 
response.  B.M. Squires, the executive secretary of the commission, urged the 
longshoremen not to leave work and said he would take up the matter in Washington the 
next day.  The locals also received a letter from NAC chairman William Z. Ripley, 
promising to contact them with either a decision or further information by February 3.12
 As promised, the NAC sent word to the locals on February 3, but the news it sent 
once again disappointed the longshoremen.  For a second time, the commission informed 
the unions that the shipping companies refused to make any concessions without an 
increase in freight rates, making an adjustment impossible at present.  In a feeble 
demonstration of its waning power, the NAC attempted to distance itself from the 
situation by placing responsibility for all future agreements squarely on the shoulders of 
the coastwise companies, which returned to private ownership on March 1.  Labor 
swiftly and decisively protested this new insult.  The night of the commission’s 
announcement, members of Local 385 voted to walk off the Morgan-Southern Pacific 
docks the next morning in protest of the commission’s decision.  ILA headquarters 
ordered the Mallory Line workers not to involve themselves in the strike, but gave no 
reason for this decision.  The only noteworthy event of this two-week long strike 
occurred on February 5 when twenty-five hundred longshoremen in New Orleans voted 
to join the men.  Galveston’s aggrieved workers simply remained at home, neither 
picketing nor demonstrating during the short walkout.13   
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 With the end of their reluctant vacation on February 20, the men returned to work 
with further promises that action would follow sometime between March 5 and 15.  
Wary of these oaths after so many recent disappointments, coastwise locals in New York 
anticipated the worst and walked out on March 12.  Showing a bit more restraint, their 
counterparts in Galveston gave the NAC and their employers the benefit of the doubt 
until March 19.  When they received no word from the shipping companies, the men “at 
last woke up to the fact that their loyalty to the city and country had caused them to 
allow their employers to play with them for a period of six months and then be told that 
there was nothing doing.”  That night in their separate union halls, the members of 
Locals 385 and 807 voted to quit work until the coastwise lines met their wage 
demands.14  
*  *  *  * 
 In its first few weeks, the strike drew relatively little attention from the local 
press.  Considering the companies’ recent record and the brevity of the February 
walkout, few Galvestonians believed that this incident would be any different.  Both 
parties to the strike followed strategies identical to before: the longshoremen stayed at 
home and the company docks remained idle.  Commentators elsewhere, however, 
recognized the potential trouble that could result from shutting down one of the nation’s 
most fundamental industries.  On March 29, the NAC released a statement calling for an 
immediate end to the conflict.  According to Chairman Ripley, the strike threatened to 
cut off vital northern lumber supplies needed for the upcoming building season and halt 
the movement of perishable goods from the South.  This would devastate truck farmers 
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and guaranteed higher prices for consumers across the country.15   
 Ripley’s attempt to assign blame for the strike was even more interesting.  In a 
wonderful display of bureaucratic smoke-and-mirrors, he exonerated the shipping 
companies of any guilt.  Although Ripley defended the demands of the longshoremen 
and agreed that the rising cost-of-living made higher wages necessary, he also accepted 
the shipping companies’ argument that adjustments in their stagnant industry had to 
await an increase in freight rates. “Relief can only come when the Interstate Commerce 
Commission increases railroad rates.  The coastwise lines may then once more thrive,” 
he said.  “Until then, if it be cheaper to tie up the boats than to run them, there is but one 
choice to the [strikers].  Grievous as the hardship may be, they must either return to 
work at the existing rates or seek employment elsewhere.”16  This statement showed the 
tacit assumption that the men, not the companies, would have to sacrifice if they hoped 
for any agreement on wages.  Considering their recent victories in World War I, Ripley’s 
words indicated a reversal of fortunes for organized labor and the restoration of the 
prewar status quo.  Its need for them satisfied, the federal government quietly began 
abandoning the country’s labor unions and the workers they represented.   
   As expected, labor responded indignantly to Ripley’s statement.  An editorial in 
the Union Review, the official journal of Galveston’s Labor Council and Dock and 
Marine Council, provided the chairman with a friendly reminder that the longshoremen 
had attempted to place their grievances before the NAC for nearly six months, but the 
shipping companies and the commission thwarted every effort at adjustment.  The 
editorial went on to argue that Congress should give the ICC the power to grant such 
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increased freight rates if doing so would affect a settlement.  “The railroads have been 
guaranteed a reasonable income,” said the paper, “and if it is impossible, as is claimed, 
for the steamship companies to pay an increase in wages without an increase in freight 
rates, then why should not this increase be granted in preference to asking men to sweat 
their lives away for wages that forces [sic] them to practice the utmost economy in order 
to provide for their families only the bare necessities of life?”17
   Following Ripley’s statement, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson called a 
conference hoping to settle the strike.  Taking notice of the NAC chairman’s warnings, 
Wilson too feared the effects that a strike would have on food supplies to northern cities.  
The same day the Union Review published its editorial, three representatives of the 
Galveston longshoremen met with their colleagues and various shipping companies in 
Washington, D.C.  Dissolved later that afternoon, the conference failed to yield positive 
results as the shipping companies continued to stand stubbornly by their earlier position.  
Labor especially resented the outcome.  Not only had they sent representatives across the 
country at great expense, but they also continued to receive censure and condemnation 
from business interests claiming to speak for the larger public.  The dissolution of the 
conference provided yet another indication of the labor-government alliance’s fragility.  
A week later, the Galveston locals voted to continue the strike indefinitely until they 
received their wage demands.18
 On April 16, Mallory’s Galveston shipping agent, F.T. Rennie, released a 
statement regarding the strike.  “This company’s relation with its labor at Galveston has 
been good and we would like to have our regular labor return to work,” he announced.  
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“But if they will not resume their duties, we will be compelled to get other labor.”19  
Rennie no doubt had in mind the steamship Alamo.  In good times, this coastwise vessel 
would have been unloaded and underway with a full cargo in several days, but the strike 
had forced the ship to remain idle on the docks for nearly a month.  Rennie’s words 
indicated the companies’ willingness and intention to use strikebreakers for the first 
time.  Four days after its agent’s statement, the Mallory line began running 
advertisements in the Galveston Daily News calling for longshoremen at the rate of 
$0.60 an hour straight time and $0.90 overtime.  Two days later, the Morgan-Southern 
Pacific lines followed this example and began printing its own notices in the local press.  
Both shipping companies quickly expanded their coverage, placing ads in newspapers 
across Texas.  After interviewing some of their potential replacements, striking 
longshoremen discovered that many had responded to notices published as far away as 
Alabama and Kansas City.20       
 Rennie’s words and the advertisements signaled a new willingness to end the 
strike through all the means at the companies’ disposal.  Initially, these efforts failed to 
have much success.  In the week following Rennie’s announcement and the first 
advertisements, no more than twenty men showed up each day on the Mallory docks.  
Coming from outside Galveston, many of these strikebreakers refused to continue 
working the Alamo after learning about the conflict.  By the end of the month, the labor 
press reported that the coastwise docks only employed a handful of men and set no date 
for the completion of the work.  Despite the companies’ escalation of the conflict, the 
striking longshoremen remained on their best behavior, quietly “going about their 
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business” and offering no interference that might cause them to lose the respect of the 
community.21
 The longshoremen recognized the importance that strict attention to this strategy 
of non-interference carried.  As the labor press and both Ripley and Wilson indicated 
earlier, public opinion greatly impacted the course of the strike.  The unfortunate truth 
for labor unionists, especially those in key industries such as shipping, was that the 
effectiveness of their strikes stood inversely proportional to the amount of hardship they 
tended to impose on the American public.  The more damage a strike did to the 
consumer, the less likely the strikers would receive sympathy or support from those not 
involved.22   
 The shipping companies quickly recognized this and used the anxiety of 
Galveston business interests to their advantage.  On May 6, Mallory officials announced 
that two steamers en route from New York had changed course to dock in the rival city 
of Port Arthur rather than Galveston.  Additionally, several ships already in port would 
leave immediately to receive their cargo elsewhere.  Eight days later, Rennie declared 
that the Mallory line intended to cease operations in Galveston indefinitely and move its 
offices and terminals to Port Arthur.  J.B. Denison, vice president of the company, 
stated, “I don’t know if the Mallory line will ever return to Galveston, but in case it does, 
conditions making it possible for vessels to be worked unhampered by strikers must 
prevail.”  Morgan officials held their tongues, but on May 17, rumors leaked into the 
press that they too might relocate their affairs to either New Orleans or Sabine.  Trying 
to capitalize on this fear, the Southern Pacific’s general agent H.M. Wilkins refused to 
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confirm or deny these reports.23  
 Adding urgency to these announcements, Houston business interests began 
offering inducements to the Morgan and Mallory lines to leave the island.  With the 
completion of its Ship Channel through Galveston Bay in 1915, the port of Houston 
became a serious rival to the Island City.  According to the Houston Post, Mallory’s 
move to Port Arthur afforded “a concrete illustration of the folly of strikes.”  The 
striking longshoremen had done irreparable damage to the port of Galveston and local 
and statewide business interests, not to mention themselves and their families.  On May 
31, various Houston civic clubs, including the Young Men’s Business League, the 
Salesmanship Club, the Advertising Association, the South Texas Automobile 
Association, and the Retail Merchants Association, issued a resolution denouncing 
Galveston as a longshoremen’s town and suggested a local bond issue to secure funds 
for new dock facilities on the Ship Channel.  Houston labor, they claimed, remained 
satisfied and shipping companies did not have to worry about strikes and unrest.24
 The actions of the coastwise lines had mixed effects.  Initially, the threatened 
relocation appeared as a small victory for the longshoremen.  It seemed to indicate that 
the strike was having its intended effect upon the shipping companies’ business.  As 
proof, the longshoremen called attention to the Alamo, which lay idle for over a month 
before a handful of inefficient strikebreakers could work it.  The shipping company’s 
threat to permanently evacuate the island, however, proved much more powerful as 
propaganda and drew a significant amount of attention to the strike.  The shipping 
companies immediately began to gain many powerful allies in their fight against the 
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strikers.  One of the first converts was the local press.  With its numerous sister papers, 
many Texans viewed the Galveston Daily News as the state’s unofficial newspaper.  The 
paper used the opportunity provided by the relocation announcements to declare its 
hostility to the strike.  The arguments and grievances of the longshoremen 
notwithstanding, the strike trapped vital public business interests in the middle, the paper 
said, and should therefore be subject to settlement through mandatory arbitration.  If this 
proved ineffective, the city had a duty to take over the docks and allow its merchants to 
break the strike by loading their own goods.25   
 Mallory’s decision to place several privately-employed armed guards on their 
docks beginning the morning of May 6 proved even more effective at casting a shadow 
over the strikers.  Lacking any precedent of violence by the longshoremen, the company 
gunmen sought to associate the strikers with violence in the eyes of the local and state 
community.26  Chief of police W.J. Sedgewick upheld the peacefulness of the strike, 
stating that all Mallory property stood uninjured and would remain that way.  
Recognizing the company’s motives, organized labor immediately issued a warning to 
the longshoremen and the shipping companies.  The action “can only be construed as an 
invitation to the men on strike to depart from their peaceful methods of conducting their 
affairs and start a campaign of violence against the armed guards.”  The longshoremen 
then reaffirmed their pledge to only demonstrate within the confines of the law.  Having 
declared their belief in nonviolence, a spokesman for the strikers noted ominously, 
“Should some individual member of the organization so far forget himself as to become 
involved in a difficulty with some of these armed guards, organized labor emphatically 
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refuses to assume any responsibility for the trouble and this responsibility must rest 
solely on the shoulders of the men who brought these guards into Galveston.”27   
 Neither the companies nor the unions waited long for the gunmen to have their 
intended effect.  On May 11, the imported strikebreakers completed the work of 
unloading the Alamo and left the Mallory docks accompanied by their guards.  Followed 
by a jeering crowd, the strikebreakers made their way to the train station and boarded the 
Houston-Galveston interurban.  As the train made its way towards the causeway 
connecting the island to the mainland, the crowd began throwing rocks and other debris 
at the car, breaking several windows.  Several minutes later, unidentified persons fired 
into the train, striking the change box of conductor C.W. Fan.  George Harrison, a 
Galveston police detective guarding the train’s rear platform, received a more serious 
injury to his shin.  Bystanders rushed the officer to John Sealy Hospital, where he 
eventually recovered.28
 The Interurban Affair brought swift reactions from labor and its supporters.  The 
labor press immediately attempted to put distance between the longshoremen’s unions 
and this violence.  Regrettable as these actions were, organized labor reminded the 
public that no evidence existed directly linking the strikers or their supporters to the 
shootings.  Much to their surprise, the longshoremen received support from the police 
department.  Galveston’s fire and police commissioner A.P. Norman stated, “If I were 
the Mallory Line people, I would keep my ships away from here until the thing is 
over.”29  Chief Sedgewick responded similarly, saying that he believed the affair to be 
the work of “disturbers,” not the strikers.  Unless the longshoremen committed 
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themselves to more pronounced acts of violence, Sedgewick said, he would not increase 
the number of police officers on the waterfront beyond those already present.  Other 
commentators blamed the incident on an “alleged German radical.”  Originally 
employed as a guard, this man apparently crossed the picket lines and began inciting the 
strikers to violence against the government shortly before the shooting.  Believing this to 
be a propaganda trick devised by the companies, organized labor turned the alleged 
agitator over to the police.  The Department of Justice wasted little time and deported 
him to Germany as an undesirable citizen several days later.30   
 With this new air of militancy surrounding the strike, outside business interests 
began lending their support to the shipping companies’ struggle.  On May 22, a five man 
committee named by the Houston Chamber of Commerce arrived in Galveston carrying 
instructions to determine a solution for removing idle merchandise on the docks.  When 
Mallory officials told them to take the matter up with the longshore unions, the 
committee decided that Houston merchants should import their own labor to Galveston 
and retrieve the cargo themselves.  Enjoying police protection and special shipping rates 
from the Houston Interurban and American Wharf companies, numerous merchants 
began transporting approximately 700,000 pounds of freight from the Mallory docks to 
Houston.  Its patience for the strike exhausted, one pro-business Houston newspaper 
argued that “[the] businessmen of Houston and other cities are not to be blamed if they 
propose unusual measures for procuring their property.”31   
 Despite the shipping companies’ efforts to weaken them, the longshoremen 
deflected much of this negative press with their own propaganda and continued to 
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maintain the support of influential Galvestonians.  The island’s community of small 
merchants frequently demonstrated their allegiance to organized labor.  Responding to 
suggestions that this group should volunteer to move freight from the struck docks, an 
editorial in the Union Review reminded its readers and small business owners that the 
strike resulted from the shipping companies’ intransigence.  Loyal citizens, the men had 
only grudgingly quit work after months of failed negotiation and did not intend to harm 
the community.  Rejecting subtlety, the editorial went on to argue that continued 
prosperity for local merchants depended entirely on the dockworkers.  “It is hoped,” 
warned the writer, “[that] the majority of the merchants will not forget the cordial 
relations that have existed between the business interests in Galveston and organized 
labor in the past and not take any action that would jeopardize a continuance of the same 
cordial relations in the future.”32  The power of labor’s purse convinced many local 
merchants to take the longshoremen seriously throughout the strike. 
 Providing spiritual sanction to the dockworkers, religious figures also lent their 
support to the strike.  On May 23, the Reverend D.B. Titus delivered a sermon tinged 
with pro-labor rhetoric.  The pro-business Daily News did not miss the sermon’s 
message, euphemistically reporting its theme as “Settling the Strike.”  According to the 
minister, the laws and officers of society showed too much concern for the right of 
property and had forgotten the more sacred right of human life.  “If there is cause for 
pessimism today,” said Titus, “it is not because of strikes and deranged industrial 
conditions.  It is because we still refuse to recognize that life should be the first 
concern.”33  The sermon granted a certain amount of legitimacy to the dockworkers.  In a 
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system that overlooked the plight of the workingman, strikes existed as a necessary evil.  
Combined with the support received from local merchants and the police force, as 
illustrated in the days following the Interurban Affair, Titus’ words indicated that the 
longshoremen enjoyed the backing of a large segment of the community. 
 The support the shipping companies received from state and local businessmen 
requires little explanation.  Because their financial and economic interests overlapped, a 
decline in profits for one group could quickly involve all the others.  Similarly, labor 
problems in the longshore industry might provide an example to workers elsewhere.  
Eager to leave memories of wartime depression and government-sponsored unions 
behind, Texas’s business interests openly supported the shipping companies’ struggle 
and lent their aid in breaking the strike.  Only by destroying organized labor’s power 
could businessmen insure their own economic future. 
 Explaining the longshoremen’s support is a bit more difficult.  The answer lies in 
Texas’s transformation from rural agrarianism to urban industrialism.  By 1920, the state 
was well on its way in the proverbial move from the country to the city, from farm to 
factory.  Increasingly, businessmen and state politicians put their faith in industrial 
capitalism and its perceived ability to transform the state’s historically colonial economy 
into an independent economic powerhouse.  This process of transformation, however, 
did not automatically create a new social order.  On the contrary, it encountered 
preexisting local groups with established relations and ways of thinking.  According to 
Herbert Gutman, “economic power was not easily transformed into social and political 
power, and…the changes resulting from rapid industrialization stimulated sufficient 
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opposition to the industrialist to deprive him of the status and the authority he sought and 
needed.”  Alongside organized labor and other members of the working-class, many 
middle-class elements—in this case, merchants, city officials, and at least one member 
of the religious community—resisted the emerging system of industrial capitalism.  The 
municipal elections of 1918 and charter amendments of 1920 also demonstrated these 
groups’ lack of support.  In both cases, the established lower orders asserted themselves 
and turned the system to their advantage despite their opponent’s aristocratic status and 
ties to the island’s most powerful business interests.  By supporting the strike, 
Galveston’s non-elites rebelled once more against what they saw as an unknown and 
dangerous new social order.34
*  *  *  * 
 The recognition that the Galveston police supported the longshoremen 
represented a major turning point in the strike.  Following the violence of May 11, the 
shipping companies’ supporters began to advocate increasingly drastic measures for 
ending the strike.  Apparently forgetting that an officer received wounds escorting the 
interurban and its strikebreaking passengers, local and outside business-interests accused 
the police force of neglecting its duty.  Time and again, they said, individual officers 
refused to protect either the strikebreakers or merchants attempting to work the docks.  
One report went so far as to claim that a police officer actually gave the signal for the 
mob to attack the interurban.35  As representatives from his city prepared to visit 
Galveston, H.C. Eargle of the Houston Chamber of Commerce issued a warning soon 
echoed by many others in the local and statewide business community.  His words 
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contained an ominous forecast for the longshoremen: if local police refused to guard the 
Galveston docks, then the city and the shipping companies should obtain protection from 
state or federal authorities.36  It did not take long for Eargle’s threat to become reality.  
In less than three weeks time, state troops arrived in Galveston, their sole purpose to 
break the strike and destroy organized labor’s power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LABOR UNDER SIEGE  
Forth went the Hobby mandate 
Throughout this Texas land 
To mobilize the National Guard, 
That was his stern command. 
Ho!  Martial law and war declared, 
“By my halidom,” said he, 
“I’ll humble that Galveston, 
Galveston by-the-sea.” 
 
“Oh, Liberty!  Oh, Liberty!” 
Once cried a famous dame; 
“Alas!  Alas!  The awful crimes 
Committed in thy name!” 
‘Tis thus may cry Galveston 
As to tyranny she bends her knee 
For outraged homes and human rights— 
Galveston by-the-sea.1
 
 Penned at the end of June by an anonymous writer, these verses illustrate the 
frustration of organized labor in Galveston.  The strike was not going well for the 
longshoremen.  Day after day, hundreds of strikebreakers worked an increasing number 
of ships tied up along the Morgan and Mallory docks.  After June 10, these non-union 
workers received support from a new force in Galveston: the Open-Shop Association.  
With its anti-strike message, this organization quickly gained allies among Galveston’s 
business interests.  A question inevitably arises from this turn of events: why did the 
Island City, for decades a stronghold of workers and their unions, suddenly fall into the 
hands of organized labor’s enemies?  The answer, invoked in the poem above, was 
simple and tragic.  On June 7, Governor William Pettus Hobby took control of the strike 
situation and declared martial law in Galveston.  With support from the governor’s 
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mansion and the guns of the National Guard, Texas’s business interests did more than 
cripple the strike—they helped launch the capitalist-state alliance that proved so 
disastrous for organized labor in the 1920s. 
*  *  *  * 
 “When companies were unable to suppress labor disturbances through the use of 
their own resources or local police,” argued political scientist Robert Justin Goldstein, 
“they rarely encountered difficulty in obtaining use of the state militia.”  In the years 
between 1873 and 1937, American companies cast the National Guard in this role a 
minimum of 250 to 300 times.  The 1920s witnessed a marked increase in this practice.  
During the first five years of the decade, strike duty accounted for about 90 percent of all 
National Guard activity.2  Galveston’s longshoremen had no difficulty confirming this 
statistic.  The Texas National Guard’s first major campaign of the new decade provided 
the Galveston strikers with a discomforting prophecy of the years to come. 
 The initial steps on the road to martial law occurred immediately after the 
violence of the Interurban Affair.  Despite their anxiety about the local police force, 
Galveston’s business interests maintained at least one powerful ally within the city 
government.  As a member of the Galveston Wharf Company’s board of directors, 
Mayor H.O. Sappington maintained strong ties to the local business community.  The 
day after the shooting, he issued a statement calling for the preservation of law and order 
no matter who the offenders might be.  Two days later on May 14, four members of the 
Texas Rangers arrived in Galveston, requested by Sappington and assigned by Hobby to 
protect two new carloads of non-union laborers on the Morgan docks.  Legends aside, 
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the Rangers held an infamous reputation when it came to dealing with labor unions and 
strikes.3  Their presence in Galveston provided the first indication that the shipping 
companies and their business supporters intended to use all the resources the state had to 
offer in breaking the strike.     
 Organized labor sharply rebuked Sappington for his actions.  At a rally held on 
the steps of the courthouse May 18, approximately twelve hundred people gathered to 
hear O.A. Anderson condemn the mayor and reaffirm the peacefulness of the men 
involved in the strike.  He charged that the Mallory and Morgan lines, thanks to their 
importation of strikebreakers and armed guards, shared the responsibility for all the 
violence that had occurred.  Calling the companies’ bluff, Anderson declared their 
withdrawal from Galveston to be a propaganda tactic.  Both lines, he said, would 
ultimately return and remain on the island.  The union chief also took the opportunity to 
skewer the Galveston Daily News with sarcastic remarks about its alliance to local 
business interests.  The mass meeting concluded with a decision that the strike would 
continue until the companies met all the demands of the longshoremen.4   
 Despite these protests, the force of Rangers remained in the city and helped calm 
the situation.  Under their watchful eye, a small band of strikebreakers housed and fed on 
the Morgan docks carried out the work of clearing the steamship El Mundo.  The 
Mallory docks, meanwhile, remained quiet, attended to by only a few peaceful pickets.  
Despite occasional reports of violence against non-union workers, the Daily News 
optimistically printed at the end of May “Not as Much Freight Tied Up Here as 
Thought.”5  The days that followed rudely shattered this optimism. 
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 On Wednesday June 2, a committee from the Texas Chamber of Commerce 
arrived in Austin to meet with Governor Hobby.  Louis Lipsitz of Dallas and H.H. 
Haines, general manager of the Galveston Commercial Association, joined the 
Chamber’s president, J.G. Culbertson of Wichita Falls, in Austin.  Together with three 
business representatives from the Island City—H.A. Treat, John Jacobson, and Peter 
Cummings—these men presented the governor with a petition asking him “to provide 
adequate protection to citizens of Texas in the port of Galveston while in the pursuit of 
their work, even to the extent of declaring martial law.”  Thanks to the “utterly 
inadequate” and fully unionized police force, assaults occurred on an almost daily basis 
against these non-union American citizens.  Repeated petitions to local authorities for 
protection had yielded no help either, causing a congestion of goods valued at $5 to $7 
million.  As a result, the inventories of many mercantile establishments in Texas and the 
southwest had grown short and the downward trend in prices seen elsewhere passed over 
the state.  Hobby therefore had a constitutional duty to exercise his authority and offer 
state protection so that the operation of the docks could proceed in “a systematic, lawful, 
comprehensive fashion in the interest of the city, state, and nation.”6
 The governor immediately sprang into action, issuing a telegraphic ultimatum to 
Mayor Sappington and Galveston County Sheriff Henry Thomas the next day.  “[The 
strike] has reached proportions affecting the business interests and material welfare of 
Texas and the property rights of citizens to such an extent,” said Hobby, “that unless 
police protection is given…I shall, under the constitution and the laws of Texas, assume 
control.”  He set the deadline for action as Saturday June 5 at nine in the morning.  
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Hobby then ordered Adjutant General W.D. Cope of the Texas National Guard to 
proceed at once to Galveston, directing him “to take such action as will be necessary to 
enforce the laws of the state without partiality, and to keep open those arteries of trade 
which are essential to the prosperity and uninterrupted conduct of business in Texas.”  
Twenty nine units of the National Guard, including three machine gun companies and 
four troops of Houston cavalry, assembled in their armories to await instructions from 
Cope and the Governor.  Overriding the protests of several state senators and 
Galveston’s representative, the Texas legislature quickly appropriated $100,000 to 
sustain the troops should they be sent to the port.7   
 Organized labor responded indignantly to the business committee’s widely 
publicized pilgrimage and Hobby’s subsequent actions.  The Union Review argued that 
these “union labor haters” misrepresented the Galveston conditions to the governor, 
citing as an example the committee’s assertion that the strike delayed delivery of fifteen 
million bushels of grain.  “Any one who knows anything about the coastwise traffic out 
of Galveston,” argued the journal, “knows that the coastwise ships of the Mallory and 
Morgan line carry no grain and never have.”  Responsibility for holdups in the port’s 
grain traffic rested entirely upon the deep sea shipping companies and the rail lines that 
served them.8  I.M. Barb, president of the Galveston Labor Council, seconded this, 
saying that Hobby and the Austin committee overlooked the lack of arrests since the 
strike began.  Barb stated that the actions of the Governor were “wholly uncalled for and 
entirely unnecessary.”  J.H. Fricke, president of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast 
District of the ILA, spared no words, calling the strike “the most peaceful, law-abiding 
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controversy in history.”9
 The citizenry and municipal officials of Galveston echoed much of this criticism.  
Although they refused to be quoted, the Daily News reported that “several prominent 
business men of the city” expressed their disapproval at the threatened use of troops.  
Less guarded action emanated from the city commission on June 3, its members 
unanimously approving a resolution protesting Hobby’s actions and wiring it to Austin.  
According to the commissioners, the strikers had proven themselves, with few 
exceptions, as law abiding and peaceful citizens.  For this reason, the strikebreakers did 
not need protection.  If problems did arise, the local police force could deal with them 
itself.    The commissioners also called a mass meeting for that evening at the city 
auditorium.  In front of a crowd fifteen hundred, city attorney Frank S. Anderson and 
several labor leaders repeated the message contained in the city’s resolution—Galveston 
would view a declaration of martial law as an insult to its citizenry.  The meeting ended 
with the adoption of a resolution denouncing Hobby’s actions.10  
 The mayor’s role in the controversy was somewhat more ambiguous than the 
protest resolution bearing his signature suggests.  When word of Hobby’s intentions first 
reached Galveston, Sappington replied in a widely published telegram, “If you can move 
the freight under the constitution and laws of Texas, do it now; do not wait till Saturday.  
We will give you, as we have all others, police protection equal to that of all cities.”11  It 
is difficult to reconcile the two parts of Sappington’s statement: on the one hand, he 
practically invited Hobby to take control, but on the other, he seems to have indicated 
that action was unnecessary.  A closer examination of Sappington’s record and 
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background, however, reveals the superficial posturing contained in the latter half of this 
statement.  As mayor, part of his job included upholding the dignity and honor of the 
city, but as a businessman with ties to the waterfront, he had vital material interests at 
stake.  Considering the Mallory line’s apparent evacuation of Galveston and the Morgan 
line’s threat to follow suit, it was unlikely that Sappington would vigorously object to 
any action that might extricate the Galveston Wharf Company from further financial 
damage.  As this telegram shows, he in fact did not.  The mayor’s actions—or rather, his 
lack thereof—throughout the remainder of martial law demonstrated his complicity in 
these events.12
 On the morning of June 4, Cope arrived in Galveston accompanied by Major 
General John Hulen and Ranger Captain Joe Brooks.  After meeting with city officials in 
a closed door session, Cope and his entourage attended a public hearing presided over by 
Sappington and the commissioners.  The hearing, which featured speeches by Fricke and 
his fellow labor activist M.J. Gahagan of Local 385, presented Cope with the facts of the 
strike, reemphasizing its peaceful nature and the ability of the local police force to 
handle any situation that might arise.  Sappington admitted denying police protection on 
two occasions, but justified these refusals with the argument that an armed presence 
would have only stirred up greater trouble.  Commissioner A.P. Norman minced no 
words, branding the charges against his police force as “damn lies.”  When Cope finally 
spoke, he neglected to mention the strike at all.  Instead, he stressed that his only reason 
for visiting Galveston was to see the freight moved.  Following this statement, the 
adjutant general left the meeting and proceeded to the docks to investigate conditions.  
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The fate of the city and the strike rested entirely in Cope’s hands.13
 Many Galvestonians received a surprise when the June 5 deadline passed without 
a declaration of martial law.  After appearing on the docks that morning and observing 
the situation, Cope stated, “Freight is moving at the Mallory wharf and switchmen are at 
work moving empty freight cars and pulling out loaded ones.  Additional workers are 
employed on the docks.  The mayor and the chief of police have assured me that the 
fullest police protection will be given workers on the docks and going to and from their  
homes.”14  After returning to his hotel from the docks, the adjutant general received a 
telegram from Hobby.  The governor requested that Cope remain in Galveston and hold 
in readiness such troops as might be necessary to deal with any further holdups or threats 
of violence.  According to H.H. Haines, this announcement pleased the business 
community.  He believed that the threat of martial law would provide a sufficient 
guarantee of improvement in the port’s operations.  With the recruitment of additional 
labor, normal conditions would return shortly.  Organized labor refused to comment on 
the decision, simply taking the opportunity to reaffirm their demands and commitment to 
the strike.15
 Haines’ words carried a grain of truth.  The day after Cope’s announcement, 
reports indicated that approximately eighty non-union men had shown up on the Mallory 
docks to move and load freight.  The Daily News reported that this was “due solely to 
the presence of General Cope and a group of rangers”; nevertheless, the paper estimated 
that accumulated freight would be cleared within three or four days.16  Even more 
telling, on June 2 Southern Pacific agent C.J. Blackwell wrote a letter to Cope in which 
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he claimed that everything was running smoothly on the docks.   His company employed 
about 150 laborers and brought in new hands every day.  Blackwell also discussed the 
local police, saying, “There seems to be quite a lot of Dissatisfaction [sic] against the 
Police Department here, but all that we talked to seemed anxious to do anything they can 
to prevent any trouble.”17  Blackwell’s superior, H.M. Wilkins, stated the following day 
that increasing numbers of dockworkers came in voluntarily and that the company had 
no trouble procuring inland labor.18   
 Shipping totals upheld Blackwell and Wilkins’ claims that freight was moving 
even before Cope arrived in the city.  It is important to remember that shipping through 
the port increased substantially during the year of 1920.  Statistics indicated that $3.2 
million and $27.8 million in imported and exported goods passed over Galveston’s 
wharves during May 1920, two months into the strike.  These figures represented an 
increase over the previous May, when only $2.1 million and $27.5 million in 
merchandise visited the city.19   
 Taken together with the activity on the Mallory and Morgan docks, these 
numbers should have satisfied the demands of Hobby and the business interests who 
visited him.  Whether they attributed it to Cope’s presence or some other factor, none of 
these men could deny the movement of freight through the port of Galveston.  What 
happened next, however, revealed what the business leaders opposed to the strike had in 
mind when they appealed to Hobby for assistance.  On the afternoon of June 7, without 
warning or apparent provocation, one hundred cavalrymen of the Texas National Guard 
disembarked from a train at Galveston’s Union Station.  The commander of the city’s 
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new martial law zone, Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters, accompanied them.20
*  *  *  * 
 What happened to cause this sudden, unexplained military intervention?  
Shipping totals and observers all indicated that freight was moving without any 
interference from the strikers.  The action dumbfounded many Texans who had accepted 
such evidence.  Eschewing all journalistic flourish, one paper simply reported a 
“hitch”—exactly what kind or who it originated with, the dumbfounded author did not 
care to speculate.21  Others pointed to rumors of a general waterfront strike, first 
threatened by O.A. Anderson at a May 30 meeting.  This news provoked nervousness 
among business interests, even bringing to the attention of Hobby in their June 2 
meeting.22   
 Despite the anxiety that it caused for businessmen, the threat of a general strike 
rested on a weak foundation.  At no point did the deep sea longshoremen, or any other 
labor organization, offer more than moral support to their coastwise comrades walking 
the picket line.  Eager to break the strike, the pro-business Daily News would have 
reported any such agreement between the unions of Galveston with zeal, but on June 10, 
the paper declared exactly the opposite, reporting that “Other Crafts Will Not Be 
Called.”  Following a joint meeting between the Galveston Labor Council and the Dock 
and Marine Council, even the city’s labor leaders publicly announced their hostility to a 
general strike.  Such an expansion of the conflict, they argued, would only provoke 
further reaction from the state and thus play into the hands of the shipping companies 
and their business allies.23  Martial law continued for another four months after this 
 
 82
reassurance, indicating that other motives were behind Hobby’s decision. 
 The Houston Press articulated the best explanation for the governor’s sudden 
change of heart in a June 7 headline: “Open Shop War is On.”24  In their resolutions and 
meetings with Hobby, the business interests of Texas repeatedly expressed their belief 
that the open-shop stood as the only solution to the strike.  These interests found an ally 
in the governor’s mansion ready to use his executive authority in breaking the power of 
organized labor and overturning the gains it made during the heady days of World War I.  
Simply put, the motive behind the declaration of martial law was the establishment of an 
open-shop in Galveston.25  
 Feeding off the patriotism fostered by World War I, open-shop advocates 
attempted to hide their anti-union message in a guarantee of all men’s right to work 
regardless of whether or not they paid union dues.  According to them, employment 
existed as a contract between an employer and an individual employee, not the union.  If 
conditions appeared unsatisfactory, every worker had the right to find another job or 
negotiate individually with his employer, but strikes, no matter how small, endangered 
vital public interests.  In April 1919, the Beaumont Retail Merchant’s Association 
became the first group in Texas to declare itself in favor of the open-shop.  Soon 
thereafter, they formed the Southwestern Open-Shop Association and within two 
months, the entire city of Beaumont operated on the same principles.  As a clearinghouse 
for local groups in Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana, the 
Southwestern Association became particularly successful at spreading this anti-union 
doctrine.  Supported by civic leaders, municipal governments, and businessmen of all 
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stripes, other organizations soon emerged throughout the state.  In Dallas, the Chamber 
of Commerce sponsored the city’s new “Square Deal” Association.  By the beginning of 
1920, the open-shop was a force to reckon with in Texas.26
 Not surprisingly, these businessmen saw the longshoremen’s struggle as a perfect 
opportunity to bring this influence to the Island City.  Breaking the power of organized 
labor in such a strongly unionized town as Galveston would be a spectacular victory for 
the open-shop.  The first mention of this new force relative to the longshoremen’s strike 
came just as events began to spin out of control in mid-May.  On May 22, the same day 
that the committee of independent Houston businessmen arrived in Galveston to unload 
their merchandise, the Southwestern and Square Deal open-shop associations announced 
that they would offer whatever assistance they could in relieving the freight congestion.  
In pledging their aid, these two groups claimed to have the cooperation of similar 
organizations in twenty-one cities across the state.27  One week later, the Southwestern 
Association sent its head, F.O. Thompson, to Galveston with the goal of adding another 
city to this list.  In a meeting with local civic and business leaders, the open-shop leader 
outlined plans for inaugurating a new movement on the island.  The public did not 
receive details of this closed session.28
 Prior to Thompson’s trip, the open-shop gained a powerful partner by enlisting 
the Texas Chamber of Commerce to its cause.  At a May 29 meeting, the Chamber’s 
board of directors adopted a resolution opposing strikes, picketing, the minimum wage, 
boycotts, and “class rule by either labor or capital.”  “We are, therefore, in favor of the 
‘open-shop’,” the Chamber announced, and then proceeded to establish the three-man 
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committee that visited Austin several days later.29  Following their fateful meeting with 
Hobby, Chamber representatives and their associates from Galveston issued a lengthy 
statement addressing the strike.  The committee declared, in no uncertain terms, “In line 
with the conclusion reached by New York interests and the steamship concerns engaged 
in coastwise traffic, Galveston has determined to organize and operate an open-shop 
policy on these coastwise docks as the only solution to a serious and expensive 
obstruction to traffic and commerce.”30  Still in Galveston, Thompson supported this 
declaration, stating “the only solution of the strike situation at Galveston as at other ports 
where the union men have quit work lies in the establishment of open-shop 
conditions.”31
 These advocates of the open-shop were quite fortunate to have a man like 
William Pettus Hobby in the governor’s office.  The son of a Reconstruction-era state 
senator, this East Texas native made a name for himself at the age of twenty-nine as 
editor of the Beaumont Enterprise.  Hobby used the paper to promote civic improvement 
and commerce in his adopted city, championing everything from a deepwater port to 
improvement of the surrounding roads.  Such actions led his overly-admiring biographer 
to conclude that Hobby believed “Transportation…was the key to human progress.”  In 
1914, the young editor made the transition into politics as the state’s lieutenant governor.  
Following Governor James Ferguson’s impeachment for misappropriation of funds in 
1917, Hobby became Texas’s supreme executive authority on September 25.  Supported 
by the state’s Democratic Party and a long-honored tradition that all governors serve two 
terms, the election of 1918 returned Hobby to office in his own right.  A dynamic 
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political leader by Texas’s standards, Hobby threw his gubernatorial weight behind such 
issues as women’s suffrage, prohibition, and education reform.  He also placed the 
foundering highway department on its feet, an indication that his biographer’s 
assessment contained some validity.32  Given his obsession for transportation and 
economic improvement, it was little wonder that Hobby responded to the strike as he 
did.  Despite his reputation for progressivism, the governor could not afford to 
sympathize with striking workers in an industry as intimately connected to his obsession 
with commerce as longshoring. 
 More important than this background and legislative record, however, was 
Hobby’s willingness to use force in maintaining law and order throughout his term.  The 
governor’s first experience with martial law occurred during the Texas-Louisiana oil 
field strike that began in November 1917.  Although evidence indicated that the strike 
had proceeded peacefully, Hobby succumbed to reports of radical activity and requested 
federal troops in the area around Humble.  With the army’s help, the oil producers 
crushed the strike in January 1918.33  Hobby also played the role of commander-in-chief 
during the so-called “Red River War” between Texas and Oklahoma in mid-1919.  
Hoping to assert the state’s claim to oil found in the riverbed, the governor sent Rangers 
to the north Texas town of Burkburnett.  Before leaving office in 1921, Hobby placed 
nearly the entire state police force along Texas’s northern frontier.34  Like his actions in 
the oil fields, the Red River affair illustrated Hobby’s propensity for using force when he 
perceived the economic interests of the state to be in danger.  This made him quite 
susceptible to the propaganda and appeals for military intervention presented by the 
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open-shop committee and business interests of Texas. 
 Many Texans, especially those with ties to business, supported Hobby’s action in 
declaring martial law.  The Young Men’s Progressive League, chambers of commerce 
and Rotary Clubs from across the state, including Galveston’s, sent congratulatory 
telegrams to the governor.  Hobby’s days as a journalist and editor also gained him much 
support from the local and statewide press.  The Daily News defended Hobby’s martial 
law decision, editorializing, “[Governor Hobby] has acted with wisdom and courage in 
doing this.  He is asserting the superior rights of the people of Texas over whatever may 
be those of all others involved in the controversy…It was clearly his duty to do so.”35  
The Houston Post echoed this, claiming that those who “who have the deeper interests of 
Galveston at heart” would recognize the necessity of declaring martial law.  Over the 
next few days, arguments appeared stating that the striking longshoremen had no reason 
to protest the coming of troops.  These men had only come to Galveston to dispel fears 
of violence against non-union workers, not break the strike.  Since most of the 
longshoremen had already found other jobs, such arguments claimed, technically no 
strike existed and the employment of non-union labor did not threaten the 
longshoremen’s livelihood.36  All of these commentators carefully kept the issue of the 
strike and the open-shop separate.  They did not want to provide organized labor with 
any opportunity to support their claims against Hobby or the business interests who 
exhorted him to act. 
 Supporters of the striking longshoremen did not wait long to voice their opinions 
and take action of their own.  Galveston city officials telegraphically denounced 
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Hobby’s declaration as “the biggest outrage ever to be perpetrated on a peaceful 
community.”37  Demonstrating his uncertain attitude towards the strike once again, 
Sappington refused to endorse the telegram.  Despite the mayor’s lack of support, the 
remaining commissioners instructed city attorney Frank S. Anderson to begin injunction 
proceedings against the National Guard to prevent it from bivouacking in Menard Park.  
Located within sight of beachfront attractions and the most popular bathing areas, the 
commission was concerned that a military camp in the park would adversely affect the 
busy summer tourist season.  Hoping to appease his less-than-cordial hosts, Brigadier 
General Wolters voluntarily removed the camp to a vacant property further down the 
seawall, which several unacknowledged private parties donated for his use.  One 
commentator joked that the beautiful beachfront location of the new Camp Hutchings, 
“will to an extent compensate [the guardsmen] for the enforced military duty that they 
are under.”38
 For Galveston’s labor advocates, however, the situation was far from comical. 
On the evening of Hobby’s announcement, the Galveston Labor Council and the Dock 
and Marine Council organized a joint session.  This “indignation meeting” resulted in a 
strongly worded resolution accusing of being Hobby misinformed and ignorant of the 
facts of the strike.  “We resent with all the manhood we possess,” the resolution stated, 
“the humiliation and insult which we have been forced to suffer through the action taken 
by the governor.”  The joint meeting also charged the troops with assisting the 
establishment of an open-shop in Galveston.39  The local labor press and its supporters 
abroad offered this same assessment of Hobby’s action.  Most carried headlines 
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declaring the open-shop motives behind martial law.  The Union Review stated, “Thus 
has the reputation of our city been assassinated, the character of its citizenship 
besmirched, and the fair name of Galveston prostituted before the world by the actions 
of the smallest governor of the largest state in the nation.”  The Houston Labor Council 
even went so far as to call for Hobby’s impeachment should an independent 
investigation confirm that he abused the power of his office by aiding business over 
labor.40
 The legislative debates over funds for the military demonstrated the 
overwhelming support that lawmakers showed for Hobby.  To the displeasure of the 
majority, a handful of representatives did take the opportunity to denounce the governor 
and his business allies on the floor of the House.  “I resent the subsidizing of state troops 
of this state [sic] to jog down the throats of its citizens the Open-Shop Association,” 
cried Representative Lee Brady of Galveston County.  Brady went on to denounce the 
committee who visited Hobby, stating that they did not represent city, county, or state 
officials.  Representative Don H. Biggers of Eastland County affirmed, “I am not 
dominated by union labor.  I am standing here as a free American, or as free as John D. 
Rockefeller and that bunch will let me be.  I vote this way because I do not want to be 
dictated to by a bunch who have not given a reason for their so doing.”  Ultimately, the 
legislature paid little attention to these protests, voting 69 to 6 in favor of a $100,000 
appropriation effective through January 1921.41   
 Many individuals uninvolved with the labor movement joined these legislative 
outcasts to voice their disapproval of both the martial law declaration and its open-shop 
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motives.  G.V. Sanders, editor of the Houston Press, editorialized, “Governor Hobby has 
been led into a number of bonehead plays during his administration, but his declaration 
of martial law is by far the worst of all.”42  In Galveston, an anonymous “large 
businessman” stated that 90 percent of the city’s employers were satisfied with their 
employees and opposed to the open-shop.  They had no desire to stir up labor trouble.  
Even some of the national guardsmen appeared to be dissatisfied with Hobby’s decision.  
In Houston, officials issued arrest warrants for forty-nine soldiers who refused to report 
for duty in Galveston.  When asked why, many of the men stated they had signed up to 
fight overseas, not against strikers in their own state.43
 These protests received no response from either state officials or business 
interests.  Not only did Hobby refuse to lift his orders, but on June 10, Galveston’s 
business interests chartered the city’s first open-shop association.  The announcement 
finally confirmed the suspicions of organized labor.  Although it refused to make public 
the names of its members, the new association included approximately one hundred 
businessmen.  The directors inaugurated the open-shop with a telegram to Lieutenant 
Governor W.A. Johnson announcing their opposition to “autocracy…of labor or capital.”  
The indiscretion of this wire helped reveal the economic interests that business and state 
leaders shared.44   
 Strengthened by this support, the shipping companies of Galveston gained the 
upper hand in their battle against the striking longshoremen.  Within days, the Mallory 
line resumed its operations in the port, employing no less than 200 men to load the 
recently arrived steamship Comal.  Company vice president J.B. Denison, in Galveston 
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for nearly four weeks, felt enough confidence in the situation that he decided to return to 
New York following the formation of the open-shop association.  “More men applied 
this morning than we really needed,” he stated, “but we decided it would be a good 
policy to take them on.”45  Following Denison’s words and the general condition of the 
port, the Daily News confidently proclaimed two days later “Crisis Believed Over in 
Strike Situation.”46  Subsequent events proved this optimism unfounded—the crisis had 
only just begun. 
*  *  *  * 
 In calling forth the Texas National Guard, the business interests of the state fully 
intended to use it in establishing the open-shop in Galveston.  Time and again, these men 
and the organizations they represented expressed the belief that the longshoremen’s 
strike and the freight congestion it caused could only be resolved by operating the docks 
on open-shop principles.  In his official declaration of martial law, Hobby declared 
“there is now imminent danger of insurrection, tumult, riot, and breach of the peace, and 
serious danger to the inhabitants and property of citizens in the territory described.”  
According to the resolution, the constitution and laws of Texas clearly demanded that 
the governor assume control of the entire city of Galveston.  And assume control he did.  
By the evening of June 8, a total of 947 enlisted men and 71 officers from across the 
state occupied the city.  The military district they controlled included the entire island 
and its waterfront, as well as Pelican Island and portions of Bolivar Peninsula and the 
mainland lying within Galveston County.  All of these soldiers were either dismounted 
cavalrymen or infantrymen assigned to provisional duty.  More ominous, military 
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officials designated three troops of cavalry as machine gun squads and equipped each 
with an amazing 500,000 rounds of ammunition.  The business interests and their state 
allies intended to leave nothing to chance.47   
 Galveston’s new commander, Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters, had been 
involved in his share of controversy prior to the longshoremen’s strike.  As director of 
the Anti-Statewide Prohibition Organization and attorney for the Texas Wholesale 
Liquor Dealers Association, Wolters stood at the forefront of prohibition debates in the 
1910s.  The Spanish-American War veteran also gained political experience in 1912, 
when he campaigned and lost as a conservative Democratic candidate for the Texas 
Senate.  He vigorously opposed the nomination of Woodrow Wilson, but quickly grew 
silent following the incumbent president’s reelection in 1916.  Prior to the Galveston 
strike, Wolters gained a reputation as being something of a specialist in martial law.  The 
general gained valuable experience in the administration of military occupations at 
Rockport and Port Aransas, where he commanded troops following a hurricane in 
1919.48  Wolters was definitely the right man for the job in Galveston.  Despite all the 
official rhetoric about citizens’ rights and the sanctity of law and order, neither the 
National Guard nor its commanding officer played a neutral role in the strike situation.  
From the day the troops arrived, their orders and the actions they took showed that they 
came down decisively on the side of Texas’s business interests. 
 Wolters first action in Galveston involved securing the city and the waterfront.  
After a quick survey, the troops established several outposts, two of which commanded a 
direct view of all activity on the Morgan and Mallory docks.  Three officers, fifty 
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enlisted men, and two machine guns garrisoned each outpost, maintaining 
communications with Camp Hutchings by telephone.  Military police under the 
command of the new Provost Marshal, Colonel Billie Mayfield, began patrolling day 
and night.  An intelligence department consisting of several plain clothed officers 
supplemented this police force.  Wolters also ordered the construction of a “bull pen”—a 
detention center surrounded by double barbed wire—in which to keep anyone arrested 
by the Guard.49
 Declared immediately by Wolters, General Order No. 1 insured that the bull pen 
would soon contain inhabitants.  Several provisions of the order revealed the true 
motives behind martial law and the National Guard’s partiality: 
 3.  Interference with persons in the pursuit of their occupations will not be 
 permitted, and any person who does interfere or who attempts to interfere  with 
 any person in the pursuit of his or her occupation will be placed under arrest. 
 4.  Loitering or loafing upon the streets is prohibited. 
 5.  Crowds will not be permitted to congregate upon the streets.  Two or more 
 persons constitute a crowd. 
 6.  All assemblages in streets, parks or commons, wither by day or by night, are 
 prohibited.  It is not, however, the intention of this order to prohibit the usual and 
 customary use of the beach for pleasure purposes. 
 7.  Any person found on the streets who appears to be habitually idle and without 
 visible  means  of support will be placed under arrest.50
 
Although General Order No. 1 applied to the entire city, Wolters clearly had the strikers 
in mind when he issued it.  Denied the right to assemble, converse with strikebreakers, 
or even remain unemployed, Wolters severely circumscribed the longshoremen in their 
campaign against the shipping companies.  His order attempted to make the strike illegal 
within the military district of Galveston.51
 Dock activity responded quickly to the military presence.  Within days, the 
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coastwise shipping companies each employed several hundred hands who, despite their 
inexperience, moved freight with little interruption.  “In a few days more,” the Daily 
News reported, “conditions on the docks here, it is believed, will be practically normal.”  
Given these circumstances, many were optimistic when the governor’s personal 
secretary Ralph Soape made a trip to the island on June 15.  Authorized by Hobby to call 
off martial law if conditions warranted, Soape interviewed strikebreakers, company 
officials, and military authorities.  Apparently refused an audience with Soape, the 
striking longshoremen were conspicuously absent from these meetings.  The pro-
business interviewees he did meet provided the secretary with predictable assessments of 
the situation, charging that conditions did not warrant the removal of soldiers.  Soape 
responded to this evidence by declaring the indefinite continuation of martial law.52
 Soape’s visit coincided with an even more important event.  On the morning of 
June 15, assistant judge advocate Major C.H. Machem began hearing testimony from 
dozens of witnesses, mostly strikebreakers and company representatives, confirming 
reports of violence and intimidation against non-union workers.  G.V. Sanders offered a 
very astute observation of this investigative commission, arguing, “The governor’s 
henchmen are busily engaged in getting together the ‘dope’ which the governor DID 
NOT have to back him up when he took over the city.”  Machem’s findings did not bode 
well for those opposed to the occupation.  The final report noted at least thirty-five 
instances of intimidation directed at strikebreakers, shipping officials, and open-shop 
advocates, ranging from verbal threats to physical assaults and property damage.  The 
commission also hurled charges at the police, accusing them of neglecting their duty and 
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taking the longshoremen’s side in the conflict.  Together with Soape’s visit, the 
investigative commission conferred legitimacy on Hobby’s actions and Wolters’ 
continued presence in Galveston.53    
 Wolters’ draconian orders made him unpopular in the city.  The first major 
showdown occurred two weeks after the promulgation of General Order No. 1.  
Surprisingly, it did not involve the longshoremen’s unions directly.  On June 19, the city 
commissioners published a notice in the local papers calling a mass meeting to take 
place two nights later in the City Auditorium.  Municipal officials intended to condemn 
Hobby’s actions and demand the withdrawal of all troops.  City Attorney Anderson 
declared that General Order No. 1 violated the guarantee of peaceful assembly.  Wolters 
paid little attention to this argument, publishing his terse response the same day: “There 
will be no mass meeting.”  After reading the general’s words and receiving four copies 
of an order prohibiting the meeting, Anderson and the commission cancelled the 
meeting, saying, “We recognize the power of superior force.”  Still anticipating trouble, 
Colonel Mayfield placed a detachment of men outside the auditorium with orders to 
arrest the city officials and any organizing leader who should appear.54  A week later, 
Wolters struck once more, interrupting a regular meeting of the Galveston Labor Council 
and forcing it to adjourn.  The headline of the Union Review adequately expressed 
labor’s frustration: “Why Have a Constitution?”55
 Local merchants and the police force also felt Wolters’ presence.  Responding to 
reports that shopkeepers along the waterfront and in Galveston’s downtown business 
district refused to deal with the hundreds of strikebreakers residing on the island, the 
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commanding officer issued General Order No. 6 on June 14: 
 1.  No corporation, individual, firm or association…shall refuse or fail to sell, 
 rent, or serve at the same price charged the general public, any person because 
 such person does or does not affiliate with any labor, trade or other union, 
 association, organization or club incorporated or unincorporated. 
 2.  Any person who by words spoken or written, or by any act, token or sign, 
 attempts to intimidate, or place in fear or terror of any bodily harm, or injury to 
 the business of, any person in the territory affected by martial law…will be 
 arrested by the military authorities.56
 
The first person arrested under this new order was police officer William Mihovil,  
accused of telling a group of strikebreakers that they would be dealt with after the troops 
left.  The guardsmen turned Mihovil over to civil authorities, who revoked his 
commission.  Wolters’ victory proved brief, however; one week later, the same officials 
acquitted the patrolman and reinstated him onto the force.57  Such episodes of support 
must have been quite heartening to the longshoremen.  Rather than simply speaking out 
against martial law and the open-shop, ordinary members of the community uninvolved 
with the strike actively fought against them.  In doing so, they contested the growing 
power of local and state business leaders.58   
 The National Guard received even more opposition from Galvestonians when it 
attempted to control the tourist-filled beaches.  On June 15, a group of businessmen and 
ministers approached Police Chief Sedgewick and Police Commissioner Norman to 
request the closure of beachfront concessions, citing their use for gambling purposes.  
Both officials denied this appeal.  Although there is no direct evidence, it appears that 
the rejected petitioners approached and enlisted the support of Wolters to their cause—
on June 18, the commanding general shut down all concessions and midway games 
along the beachfront.  Reaction to these high-handed tactics came swiftly.  W.L. Roe, 
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secretary of the Galveston Beach Association, indignantly expressed “Since the troops 
have been here the city’s business has been cut down to one fifth of normal.  People are 
afraid to come here with these men butting into everything we do…Galveston is being 
used as a political football by a crowd of politicians who are attempting to put the city 
administrators in bad.”  The following day, Wolters capitulated and reopened the 
concessions, but not before issuing new orders closing all bars, brothels, and gambling 
houses.59    
 Roe’s concluding statement recalls the controversy surrounding the charter 
amendments and the popularly elected City Party.  Many Galvestonians believed that 
Wharf Company interests and the local aristocracy were using Wolters and the National 
Guard to reestablish themselves as the city’s undisputed rulers.60  The general’s new 
moral crusade indicated that these suspicions had some basis in reality.  By labeling 
Galveston a “wide open city,” Wolters created a powerful piece of propaganda against 
his opponents on the city commission.  As the military occupation carried on into July, 
the general’s denunciations grew louder.  In a July 4 announcement dismissing 525 
officers and enlisted men needed at home for the upcoming harvest, Wolters took the 
opportunity to condemn municipal officials.  “It is necessary to keep [the remaining 500 
troops] here because the city officials are backing up the strikers,” he declared.  “If we 
leave every non-union man here will either be run out of town or killed.”  Wolters went 
on to claim that the administration owed its election to the city’s African-American 
voters, who he called “the worst and most insolent in Texas.”61  There could be little 
doubt that Wolters was trying “to put the city administrators in bad.”  Along with strike-
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related violence and vice, the general now added black Galvestonians to the list of things 
municipal authorities were unable or unwilling to control.  Accusations such as this 
would not go unnoticed for long in the tense, postwar racial climate of the Jim Crow 
South.   
 The seeds of this propaganda soon bore bitter fruit that confirmed the suspicions 
of many Galvestonians about the military’s true intentions in their city.  Following a 
conference in Austin with Wolters and Adjutant General Cope, Hobby issued a 
proclamation suspending civil authority in Galveston on July 15.  The new order made 
specific reference to Mayor Sappington, all four commissioners, City Attorney 
Anderson, the judge of the city court Henry Odell, and the entire police force, including 
Chief Sedegewick.  The order “suspended and restrained [all officials] from performing 
or discharging any duty appertaining to their respective offices, with respect to enforcing 
the penal laws of the State of Texas and the City of Galveston, during the pendency of 
martial law.”62  “The laws of this state are not being faithfully executed,” proclaimed 
Wolters, “nor can they be…so long as the above named city officials are permitted to 
remain in their respective offices and use the power and influence of their official 
position in aiding and encouraging the lawless element of the city.”  On Wolters’ orders, 
Colonel Mayfield and the Provost Guard took control of police headquarters and all 
police functions for the city.  The shipping companies’ “special marine policemen” 
retained their positions under military jurisdiction.  Violators of state laws would receive 
trial in a competent civil court, and Captain O’Brien Stevens, Provost Judge for the 
military, would try violations of all local ordinances.63   
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 Galveston’s official response to this new insult was predictably indignant.  In a 
statement released the same day and signed by everyone but Sappington, the 
commissioners charged that their displacement and the declaration of martial law were 
political moves “for the avowed purpose of establishing the ‘open-shop’, destroying 
union labor and taking over the city government.”  They denied once more that any 
strike-related violence ever took place and affirmed their ability to handle the situation.  
These men also hurled countercharges of repression and autocratic treatment at the 
guardsmen, citing as an example the imprisonment of an elderly tailor for “profiteering” 
when the latter refused to sew a sergeant’s chevrons on his uniform at reduced price.   
Even more serious, municipal officials charged soldiers with responsibility in the death 
of Mrs. W. Auderer, who had been struck by a stray bullet in her home near Camp 
Hutchings.  “Any further encroachment upon the right of the people of this city to 
govern themselves,” warned the commissioners, “will be resisted by application to the 
federal courts, where we may reasonably expect the constitutional guarantees to be 
respected and enforced.”64  Two weeks later, Anderson followed through on this threat, 
filing a suit to enjoin Hobby and Wolters from any further maintenance of martial law.  
Robert G. Street, presiding judge of the 56th District Court, rejected the injunction 
application, upholding the constitutionality of martial law and declaring the governor to 
have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter.65
 The suspension of civil authority prompted Hobby’s first and only visit to 
Galveston on July 21.  Accompanied by Soape, Adjutant General Cope, and Attorney 
General C.M. Cureton, the governor met behind closed doors with a small group of local 
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judges and lawyers to discuss a plan for ending the occupation.  The Daily News 
speculated that the proposal involved setting up the local judiciary as a central 
committee, which would then direct the efforts of Texas Rangers and a new citizen’s 
police force in protecting strikebreakers, but could not confirm these reports.  Whatever 
the topic of discussion, Hobby apparently left the meeting unimpressed.  When asked 
what it would take to have the troops removed, he responded “I must have absolute 
assurance—no, to put it stronger than that, an absolute demonstration that Galveston can 
care for the situation here so as to insure the uninterrupted movement of freight through 
this port and the protection of all workers connected with shipping.”66  Responsibility for 
ending the occupation lay squarely in the hands of Galveston itself.  
*  *  *  * 
 Throughout the first month and a half of martial law, the state troops stationed on 
the island remained on good behavior.  The few incidents that occurred created little 
public reaction or were quickly resolved by military officials.  The inactivity and silence 
of the striking longshoremen mirrored this.  Unable to picket, most of the men found 
temporary jobs on deep sea piers and activity on the Morgan and Mallory docks went on 
with little interruption.  By the end of July, the situation had become so quiet that Walter 
J. Rowe, one of the Texas Rangers still stationed in the city, requested a transfer to 
another post.  Soon thereafter, four steamships lay tied up on the Mallory docks, the first 
time so many vessels had been present since the strike began.  Away from the outposts 
and daily drills of the National Guard, few visitors would have suspected any kind of 
conflict in the city.67   
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 Wolters’ assumption of civil authority quickly changed this peaceful atmosphere.  
Following the July 15 declaration, the actions of the National Guard generated a great 
deal of negative publicity.  Whether accidental or intentional, these events negatively 
affected the way most people viewed the occupation.  The first such incident occurred on 
July 30.  Shortly after midnight, a sentry near Camp Hutchings, Private J.C. Tyer, 
signaled an approaching car to halt.  When the vehicle failed to stop, the young 
guardsman fired a single shot, striking its drunken operator Herbert A. Robertson in the 
back.  A captain in the National Guard recently called to duty on the island, Robertson 
died an hour later in John Sealy Hospital.  Military authorities placed Tyer under arrest 
pending an investigation of the shooting.  Justice of the Peace E.B. Holman issued a 
warrant charging Tyer with murder, but Wolters refused to turn him over.  Supporting 
his general, Hobby said that the incident lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Guard.  At his court martial, the young private testified that he intended to shoot out the 
automobile’s tire, but missed and hit Robertson.  After receiving word of his acquittal by 
the court martial, the Galveston County sheriff arrested Tyer, who left the island after 
petitioning for a change of venue.68
 The subsequent fate of Private Tyer was less important than the effect that his 
actions had on public opinion.  Robertson’s shooting became the most recent in a string 
of accidental deaths known or suspected to be associated with the National Guard.  Days 
before, Private Abe Ginsburg unintentionally shot himself in the face while showing his 
revolver to his sister-in-law.  The mysterious death of Mrs. Auderer preceded both these 
incidents.  During her autopsy, medical examiners extracted a steel-jacketed bullet 
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suspiciously similar to the ones used in the guardsmen’s high-powered rifles.  The 
spilling of blood added another dimension to what many already viewed as a shameful 
crime perpetrated against Galveston.  Many people questioned the competency of state 
troops and their ability to maintain law and order on the island.  Instead of seasoned 
police officers, “green, untrained, irresponsible youths of the Texas National Guard, 
bearing loaded army rifles and pistols, have been charged with the maintenance of order 
and the enforcement of the law,” claimed the Houston Press.  In light of these three 
incidents, more and more people began to question the ultimate usefulness of 
maintaining martial law in Galveston.69   
 Throughout the month of August, the military presence incurred further public 
disfavor through the high-handed actions of its soldiers and officers.  Eyewitnesses 
began to report that many of the guardsmen, instead of following Wolters’ orders to rid 
the city of vice, were in fact partaking in it.  Captain Robertson’s inebriated condition at 
death indicated that the general’s clean up plan did not quite have its full, advertised 
effect.  In an unrelated case, a grand jury report upheld the persistence of Galveston’s 
vice problem, indirectly implicating the martial law regime.70  Shortly after this, Wolters 
received a visit from a representative of Fox Film News wanting to use the guardsmen to 
shoot a picture about the Galveston strike.  The general obliged and provided his soldiers 
as actors, while cameras caught the action in a staged “battle” between strikers and 
soldiers at Union Station.  This transparent propaganda did not amuse city officials.  
After condemning the film for its misrepresentation of Galveston, they quickly received 
word of its cancellation from the studio.  Even the Galveston Commercial Association 
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and the Young Men’s Progressive League, both of which favored the presence of state 
troops, joined the commissioners in denouncing the picture.71  Besides upsetting 
prominent Galvestonians, including some of his most adamant supporters, Wolters’ 
decision to allow the film once again indicated his lack of neutrality in the strike.   
 The National Guard’s most spectacular and damaging indiscretions involved the 
Houston Press and its editor G.V. Sanders.  Since the declaration of martial law, almost 
every issue of this progressive paper carried news of the Galveston strike.  Although the 
paper reported many exaggerated and obviously propagandistic stories—in the wake of 
the Guard’s cleanup campaign, for example, front page stories accused soldiers of 
drinking hair tonic—Sanders’ criticisms of Wolters and Hobby were often quite 
perceptive.  He rarely missed an opportunity to skewer either of them for their actions.  
In one particularly incendiary front page article, the paper compared Wolters to General 
Ludendorff, the German army’s supreme commander in World War I.72  Remarks such 
as these aroused anger among military officials and made the Houston Press unwelcome 
in the martial law zone.  The day after Robertson’s death, the National Guard arrested 
H.E. Bunch for doing nothing more than selling the paper.  Several weeks later, Sanders’ 
comments apparently got the better of Major Julius Dorrenfield, who assaulted Press 
correspondent John H. Regan.  When asked at his court martial why he attacked the 
reporter, Dorrenfield responded that he had simply defended the honor of the National 
Guard against the paper’s false statements.73   
 No sooner had this occurred than a much more serious incident took place.  On 
the night of August 30, Sanders had just left the Houston Country Club when a large 
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man in plain clothes approached him.  After mumbling something about an arrest 
warrant, two others joined the man and attempted to force Sanders into a nearby car.  
Several bystanders, many of them prominent Houston city officials and businessmen, 
quickly intervened and Sanders escaped.  Once the situation calmed down, the would-be 
abductors revealed their identities: all three held commissions as lieutenants in the 
National Guard stationed at Galveston.  Before returning to their proper jurisdiction on 
the island, Lieutenant J.A. Dempsey presented an order from Colonel Mayfield which 
read, “You are ordered to arrest Sanders, editor of the Houston Press, for writing and 
circulating highly incendiary literature calculated to precipitate serious trouble in the 
zone of military law, both among civilians and soldiers.”74
 The response to this bungled seizure was tremendous.  Attempting to shield 
himself from criticism, Wolters declared that although he had issued instructions to 
arrest Sanders, the guardsmen acted on their own in taking the matter outside Galveston.  
Houston City Attorney Kenneth Krahl turned his anger towards Hobby, saying “I have 
been convinced for some time Texas had a fool for governor.  If he doesn’t take proper 
action to clean out the whole bunch guilty of [this] outrage, I will be convinced that we 
have a knave for governor.”  The mayor of Houston, A.E. Amerman, called the affair “a 
very foolish stunt” and wired his objection to Austin.  Despite these protests, the 
governor remained publicly silent about the affair.75  The Houston Labor Journal argued 
that the attempted arrest resulted from “something in the military calling that challenges 
the stability of reason, of mental equipoise, and sound judgment.”76  Many pro-business 
newspapers joined the Journal’s editors in denouncing the high-handed action.  “Even if 
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the military authorities had attempted to execute their warrant in the military zone of 
Galveston,” the Houston Post editorialized, “it would have been an unwarranted abuse 
of military authority…there is or ought to be no military despotism in this State.”77   
 Sanders meanwhile devoted almost the entire energy of his paper to attacking 
Wolters, Hobby, and the military occupation of Galveston.  The editor also filed charges 
of false imprisonment against the three officers with the Harris County sheriff.  Perhaps 
on the orders of his commanding officer, Colonel Mayfield attempted to control this 
damage and Sanders’ allegations with a September 1 announcement that he accepted full 
responsibility for the failed arrest.  Wolters immediately relieved Mayfield of his duty as 
Provost Marshall and confined him to quarters.  The commanding general then notified 
civil authorities that he would not allow them to arrest any of the officers involved.  
Instead, a court martial composed entirely of National Guard officers convened on 
September 7 to decide the four men’s fate.  The court martial cleared the three 
lieutenants of all charges, accepting the argument that they had only followed orders.  
Mayfield, on the other hand, proclaimed his guilt in ordering the action.  He continued to 
believe that the arrest lay within his jurisdiction since Sanders’ articles aroused tension 
among both the soldiers and citizenry.  After three days of testimony from witnesses, 
including Sanders, the court martial reached a verdict.  Before making their decision 
public, however, the officers sent sealed copies to Austin for Hobby to approve.  The 
Houston Press cried foul, labeling the trial a farce.  Two weeks later, Hobby proved 
these suspicions correct by announcing Mayfield’s acquittal and recommission in the 
Guard.78
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 Although the evidence is scant, it seems that the bad press garnered by 
Mayfield’s actions and the National Guard’s indiscretions may have given Hobby a 
reason to consider withdrawing the troops.  A cryptic statement carried in the Dallas 
Dispatch and reprinted by the Houston Press quoted the governor as saying that “a crisis 
is expected in Galveston soon [and] there may be no further need of troops there.”79  
What Hobby meant by this statement and whether it was connected to recent events is 
unclear.  One thing, however, is certain.  On the afternoon of September 18, Hobby and 
city officials made public the terms of an agreement to end martial law. 
 Since the beginning of September, a committee consisting of religious leaders, 
local businessmen, labor representatives, and the mayor and commissioners had been in 
meetings to formulate a plan for removing troops.  On September 16, Hobby received a 
copy of their suggestions signed by committee president Jacob Singer and Mayor 
Sappington.  The committee requested that the governor send an experienced Ranger 
officer to command the police department and exercise authority over all peace officers 
in the city.  To assuage anxieties about police neglect, the commissioners pledged “to 
suspend temporarily and remove from office permanently…any officer of the city of 
Galveston who attempts in any way to impede, obstruct, or interfere with the protection 
of workers and the enforcement of the law.”  In addition, the citizen’s committee would 
continue in an advisory capacity with the purpose of bringing about “a more amicable 
understanding between employers and employees in the city.”80
 Embarrassed perhaps by the National Guard’s recent actions, Hobby announced 
his satisfaction with the plan and ordered Ranger Captain Joe Brooks to Galveston, 
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where he would assume police control once martial law ended on October 1.  All troops 
would leave the island between October 5 and 10.  Hobby carefully qualified both 
announcements, however, stating that he would not hesitate to re-implement martial law 
if the situation once again deteriorated.  Keeping these words in mind, the displaced 
mayor and city commissioners abruptly regained their executive authority at midnight on 
October 1.  That same night, Captain Brooks and thirty five Rangers replaced General 
Wolters and the National Guardsmen as Galveston’s police authority.  In a final 
indication of the motives behind martial law, local businessmen hosted a banquet for the 
remaining soldiers at the luxurious Hotel Galvez.  These “representative citizens” 
presented Wolters with a silver loving cup whose inscription read “An Unpleasant Duty 
Well Performed.”   On the morning of October 8, the remaining 500 troops left the 
island without further ceremony, ending Galveston’s four month long encounter with 
military occupation.81
*  *  *  * 
 In the midst of all the controversy over martial law, Congress made an important 
decision regarding the nation’s shipping industry.  On August 1, federal lawmakers 
consented to an increase in the freight rates of all railroads, electric railways, and 
coastwise steamship lines.  The decision overjoyed the longshoremen.  With the obstacle 
to their wage demands removed, a settlement of the strike seemed to be at hand.  Less 
than three weeks later, thousands of coastwise workers in New York began returning to 
their jobs after their employers agreed to submit all grievances to arbitration.  Galveston 
Locals 385 and 807 had every reason to believe that they would receive similar 
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treatment when they petitioned the Morgan and Mallory lines to arbitrate a settlement.  
The companies’ response quickly shattered this optimism.  In order to be considered for 
reemployment, members of the striking unions needed to agree to three conditions: the 
employment of clerks and foremen at company, rather than union, discretion; prohibition 
of all union delegates from the docks; and non-discrimination in hiring.  This final 
condition was the most onerous.  It meant that no man—union or non-union, black or 
white—would receive preference on Galveston’s coastwise docks.  The strikers voted 
unanimously to reject these blatantly open-shop terms.82  
 Martial law had its intended effect.  With the help of the National Guard and 
Governor Hobby, local and statewide business interests threw open the doors on 
Galveston’s closed-shop.  In O.A. Anderson’s words, “Texas is a corporation 
representative, ruled by a corporation governor.”  Deriving inspiration from the success 
on the docks, members of the new Open-Shop Association quickly spread their message 
across the island.  On July 24, thirteen of Galveston’s cotton compress companies 
informed their union workers that they henceforth would operate on open-shop 
principles.  Soon thereafter, members of the Marine Checkers Union, the Machinists 
Union, and the Cooks and Waiters Union received similar news from their employers.83  
Texas’s business interests now needed only two more things to consolidate their 
position—a successful conclusion to the longshoremen’s strike, and legal assurance that 
it would never happen again. 
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CHAPTER V 
RACE, UNION, AND DEFEAT 
 Jim Crow ruled the South in 1920.  Virtually all southerners embraced the system 
of racial hierarchy and segregation that characterized their society.  In Galveston, few 
places illustrated the island’s racial tensions more strongly than the segregated 
waterfront.  Most of the time, an uneasy equilibrium existed between black and white 
dockworkers.  Each went about his business with little concern for the other.  When their 
paths did cross, conflict and struggles for control of the docks inevitably resulted.  
Occasionally, however, these segregated workers disregarded social norms, uniting in 
brief but astonishing displays of class solidarity.  The Galveston longshoremen’s strike 
was such an episode.  Unwilling to disrupt the delicate biracial balance they had forged 
on the docks, the longshoremen came together in protest of the Morgan and Mallory 
lines’ apparent indifference to race in the employment of strikebreakers.  “Born of 
economic necessity and strategic considerations,” argues historian Eric Arnesen, 
“biracial unionism…served to bridge some gaps between blacks and whites by creating 
an arena for interracial contact, deliberation, and collaboration.”  The true test of this 
solidarity lay in its ability to withstand the pressures of the strike.1
*  *  *  * 
 The southern waterfront has long been a meeting place for blacks and whites.  
This history began in slave times, when African-Americans made up a significant 
portion of the waterfront labor force.  White owners believed that the abilities of their 
human chattel were naturally suited to the occupation’s backbreaking physical labor.  In 
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many ports, unfree blacks comprised enjoyed a majority on the docks, working uneasily 
alongside their free white counterparts.  With emancipation and the end of the Civil War, 
propertyless blacks and whites flooded southern waterfronts hoping to make a living in 
the relatively unskilled longshore profession.  As the industry and its workforce 
expanded, calls for union organization grew as well.  Either by themselves or with the 
help of organizers, African-Americans began forming separate unions alongside those of 
their white counterparts.  Economic equality and cooperation between segregated locals 
stood at the heart of biracial unionism.  With its long history of race mixing, the 
longshore industry was particularly well-suited to this arrangement.  Because they 
traditionally associated African-Americans with waterfront work, white longshoremen 
did not generally share the same feelings of encroachment that unionists in other 
industries often decried.  Most contemporaries, as well as historians, pointed to New 
Orleans as the South’s most successful example of biracial unionism.  In 1880, Crescent 
City longshoremen established the Cotton Men’s Executive Council, an organization that 
brought together black and white dockworkers through work sharing agreements and 
united contract negotiations.  Despite setbacks and name changes over the years, this 
powerful council benefited waterfront union members of both races and exerted a 
significant amount of control on the New Orleans levee.2
 Along the Upper Texas Gulf Coast, biracial alliances between longshoremen did 
not occur as frequently and had less staying power when they did.  In contrast to New 
Orleans, where strong African-American unions developed independently, black 
organization in nineteenth century Galveston began in response to the formation of white 
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unions unwilling to associate with them.  Galveston’s first waterfront union, the 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association (SBA), did not allow African-Americans in its 
ranks, resolving soon after its formation not to work for anyone “who shall employ to 
work on shipboard persons of color.”3  As cotton production and the demand for labor to 
handle it increased, these white screwmen faced greater competition and began actively 
protesting the employment of blacks.  To counter such attacks, respected black politician 
Norris Wright Cuney organized the Colored Screwmen’s Benevolent Association 
(CSBA) in 1883.  Hoping to secure a monopoly on waterfront employment for blacks, 
Cuney approached the Mallory line for a contract and urged CSBA members to undercut 
white longshoremen by accepting their traditional jobs for less pay.  The SBA responded 
by striking, but the start of the busy season forced the white screwmen to resume work.  
The shipping companies soon overshadowed this antagonism by employing non-union 
black labor.  This cheap workforce and the competition it brought to the trade forced 
both organizations to reconsider their strategies and collaboration between the SBA and 
CSBA increased dramatically during the 1880s and 1890s.  Still in its nascent stage, the 
Galveston waterfront’s first biracial alliance would not reach the level of solidarity 
found in New Orleans for another twenty years 4
 Part of the reason this racial cooperation lagged behind that found on the levees 
of the Mississippi lay in Galveston’s employment structure.  Because the railroad 
companies and their allied shipping lines hired regular freight handlers, different docks 
quickly became the exclusive enclaves of black or white workers.  Although this system 
transformed Galveston into one of the nation’s first “decasualized” ports, it also impeded 
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biracial unionization.  As long as everyone stayed at his respective dock, there was little 
incentive to organize or unite across racial lines.  Those supporting biracialism usually 
confined their efforts to maintaining the status quo.  In more specialized and competitive 
occupations like cotton screwing, collaboration occurred even less frequently.  Here, 
racially divided workers followed a pattern of undercutting and strikebreaking that older 
historians often cited as evidence of the southern labor movement’s failure.5   
 The turn of the century brought significant changes to Galveston’s docks. More 
than anything else, the introduction of the International Longshoremen’s Association 
(ILA) dramatically increased the number of union members in the port.  Unlike many 
unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the early twentieth 
century, the industrial ILA committed itself to the organization of both black and white 
longshoremen.  Although this decision may have had its basis in a progressive ideology, 
pure and simple pragmatism played an even more important role.  In 1910, African-
Americans accounted for nearly 74 percent of the longshoremen in eight southern states.  
Texas blacks made up just over 35 percent of the waterfront workforce.6  If it hoped to 
be successful, the union could not ignore this great mass of workers.  At the founding 
convention of the Gulf Coast and South Atlantic district held in September 1911, ILA 
president T.V. O’Connor stated, “[this meeting] was called for the purpose of bringing 
about a united longshoremen’s organization in the South.”  O’Connor went on to express 
his belief that if properly organized, the new district could affect industrial parity, though 
not social equality between black and white longshoremen across the South.  The same 
meeting also carried resolutions from a number of southern locals urging the union to 
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organize black dockworkers.  White workers had begun to realize that the southern labor 
movement’s only hope for success was to include the large numbers of potential 
African-American competitors within its ranks.7
 In 1912, the ILA achieved its first major biracial success in Galveston with the 
acceptance of an amalgamation agreement between the port’s cotton locals.  The so-
called “50-50 Plan” aimed to reduce competition between African-American and white 
longshoremen by dividing work in the port equally.  Members modeled the plan after a 
similar agreement formed and used intermittingly in New Orleans since 1886.  Initially, 
the 50-50 Plan created as many problems as it solved.  Whites complained that blacks 
received too much work, while blacks claimed that their numerical superiority entitled 
them to more than half of the jobs.  The white screwmen, Galveston’s traditional 
waterfront aristocrats, especially resented the agreement.  Forced to sign by the growing 
technical superfluity of their craft, the SBA’s successors in Local 317 repudiated the 
plan less than a year later and negotiated contracts with local stevedores that undercut 
their African-American colleagues.  Following an appeal by the black screwmen in 
Local 329 to the ILA’s Grievance Committee and a visit from O’Connor, Local 317 
reluctantly accepted the amalgamation agreement once more.  By the time of the ILA’s 
1914 national convention, however, O’Connor again reported that neither the white 
locals nor the company contractors had upheld the renewed agreements.  After stripping 
Local 317 of ILA recognition, the union grudgingly agreed to amalgamate for the third 
time.  “Embraced reluctantly by many of the parties,” Arnesen argues, “Galveston’s new 
biracial system was but a weak reflection of New Orleans.”  Racial solidarity in the port 
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of Galveston was never so sacred that it could not be broken if either group felt some 
benefit could be derived from doing so.8  
 The years leading up to the coastwise strike supported this conclusion and made 
the need for greater biracial cooperation on the waterfront even more obvious.  As 
statewide economic conditions deteriorated during World War I, Galveston’s shipping 
companies became less willing to uphold the racial status quo on the docks and began 
hiring whoever would work the cheapest.  The United States’ entry into the war in 1917 
exacerbated this tension.  As millions of southern blacks migrated to northern industrial 
centers and their understaffed munitions factories, Texas employers took the opportunity 
to begin widespread hiring of non-union labor once again.  In the longshore industry, 
many of the jobs went to African-Americans who stayed behind during the Great 
Migration or moved to various Texas ports.  The issue of migration also became more 
sensitive, especially after companies began hiring imported Mexican laborers as 
strikebreakers.  Many Texas unions, including the ILA, expressed a greater interest in 
organizing these “replacement” groups of blacks, Mexicans, and women.9
 Rising African-American political activism during and immediately following 
the war also hurt the efforts of biracial unionization advocates.  Due to migration and the 
draft, blacks enjoyed a significant amount of leverage in the labor scarce South.  The 
traditional demands for better wages and work conditions became wedded to broader 
hopes of expanded political and civil rights for a great many of these African-
Americans.  In Texas, the black press urged its readers at home to exercise the same 
assertiveness shown by their sons and brothers fighting in France.  Blacks in Texas also 
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began organizing branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) beginning in 1918.  Many of these activists gained experience in the 
labor movement and it is likely that working-class members constituted the core of 
NAACP membership in the state.  In November, black longshoremen of ILA Local 807 
chartered Galveston’s first branch of the association.  By the time the strike began in 
March 1920, this chapter boasted well over two hundred members.  A small number of 
more militant African-Americans took the NAACP’s agitation for equality even further.  
In 1919, federal investigators reported that several witnesses had seen Galveston’s black 
screwmen storing high-powered rifles in their union hall.  Although such reports were 
infrequent and remained largely unsubstantiated, they guaranteed tensions between race 
conscious workers in all industries.10    
 White Texans reacted vigorously to the rising militancy of African-Americans.  
Censorship, repression, and violence greeted black activists and newspapers across the 
state.  White vigilante committees arose to defend Texas against the suspected race war, 
terrorizing blacks in many locations throughout the state.  In August 1919, the state 
attorney general subpoenaed the NAACP’s records after its members made public 
appeals to end segregation.  Shortly after, John Shillady, an official of the association 
visiting Austin, received a vicious public beating from a group of men that included a 
Travis County judge and constable.  When the New York office of the NAACP protested 
these actions, Governor Hobby’s response revealed the anxieties of white Texans: “Your 
organization can contribute more to the advancement of both races by keeping your 
representatives and their propaganda out of this state than in any other way.”11   
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 In such a tense atmosphere, the organization and maintenance of biracial unions 
on Galveston’s docks proved difficult.  White longshoremen likely kept a watchful eye 
on the activities of their colleagues in Local 807.  The fact that the local NAACP chapter 
also included black workers from other occupations did little to dispel fears of a racial 
conspiracy directed against whites.  The ILA’s strict policy of refusing to discuss social 
equality between the races did not prepare white unionists for the growing militancy of 
their black colleagues.  Any association attempting to inject the social equality question 
into public discourse threatened to disrupt the delicate balance forged on the Galveston 
waterfront.  As the coastwise longshoremen of the Island City, both black and white, 
began preparing for the strike in the months leading up to March 1920, these issues and 
the waterfront’s troubled past were no doubt on their minds.  The race question quite 
literally divided the port in two.  Peace prevailed uneasily only as long as the black 
workers of Local 807 employed on the Mallory docks stayed away from the white 
workers of Local 385 and Morgan-Southern Pacific property.  The strike tested this 
system by forcing the two races into closer proximity with one another, not socially or 
geographically, but in terms of its outcome and each group’s economic future.  If 
Galveston’s reputation among business interests as a longshoremen’s town was to 
endure, the resolution of the strike had to include both races. 
*  *  *  * 
 When Galveston’s sixteen hundred coastwise longshoremen walked off the job 
on March 19, it is doubtful that few, if any, believed that race would figure prominently 
in the strike.  Brought about by the rising cost-of-living and the shipping companies’ 
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intransigence on wages, the striker’s demands mentioned nothing about amalgamation or 
social equality or any other controversial racial topic.  Even maintenance of the racial 
status quo did not emerge as an important theme in most early reports on the strike.  
Perhaps attempting to minimize racial conflict, the local press upheld contemporary 
stereotypes about stratification and African-American behavior in its accounts of the 
industrial dispute.  The Daily News reported that white longshoremen, ostensibly 
demonstrating southern politeness and the superiority of their race, notified the Morgan-
Southern Pacific line of their intent to strike the evening of March 18.  In contrast, less 
thoughtful African-American workers simply walked off the Mallory docks following 
lunch.  Similarly, the Union Review announced that white Local 385 had voted 
unanimously to quit work, whereas Local 807 only did so “by large majority,” and then 
only as an offer of assistance to “other interested Locals.”  The labor journal went so far 
as to report each union’s actions in separate articles, the white longshoremen receiving 
top billing, of course.12   
 For the first month of the strike, such prejudicial reports offered the only 
indication that racial questions might be involved.  Black and white longshoremen 
stayed away from the docks in their respective neighborhoods of the city with little 
apparent contact between them.  Given the racial tensions that followed World War I, 
non-intercourse and the preservation of racial stratification seemed like the most 
effective approach, at least to the port’s white workers.  This situation began to change, 
however, in mid-April with the Mallory line’s announcement that it intended to use 
strikebreakers to move the rapidly accumulating freight on the waterfront.  The 
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importation and hiring of non-union labor forced the segregated longshore unions to 
reevaluate their overall strategy.  With the shipping companies using all the means at 
their disposal to break the strike, economic necessity and the desire for a successful 
resolution of the conflict brought Local 385 and Local 807 together in protest of these 
policies.   
 The first manifestation of this biracialism occurred soon after the Mallory line’s 
decision to use non-union labor in late-April.  In order to coordinate union actions, the 
locals established joint executive boards between themselves.  These boards prepared 
reports pertaining to the strike and then sent them to the regular meetings of each local 
for their members to approve.13  On May 5, a group of imported strikebreakers resumed 
work on the Mallory steamship Alamo, protected by a small force of private armed 
guards.  In response to this provocation, longshore representatives called a mass meeting 
of the black and white coastwise locals for the next evening.14  Approximately two 
thousand men attended the gathering, voting unanimously to remain on strike until they 
received their wage demands.  The president of Local 385, O.A. Anderson, spoke to the 
crowd, cautioning his audience to remain on their best behavior and perpetrate no 
violence against the strikebreakers.  “We are accused of violence when not a single case 
of the kind can be cited,” he announced.  “We have neither threatened nor committed 
violence and are opposed to guards being stationed at the docks, as such is entirely 
unnecessary and places us in the wrong light.”  Recognizing the necessity of maintaining 
favorable public opinion, black and white participants also adopted a resolution 
reaffirming their loyalty to the city of Galveston.15  
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 As an indicator of racial solidarity among the port’s longshoremen, this meeting 
was a very important.  It demonstrated an emerging sense of economic unity between the 
black and white strikers.  As the agreed upon domain of African-American workers, the 
employment of strikebreakers and armed guards on the Mallory docks should not have 
aroused any opposition from white union members, but Local 385’s participation in the 
May 6 protest gathering indicated that it recognized a similarity between its own 
interests and those of Local 807.  If the Mallory line could successfully associate seven 
hundred black strikers with violence, then the Morgan-Southern Pacific agents could do 
the same with nine hundred white strikers.  Such a misrepresentation threatened to 
damage organized labor’s image in the public eye and make it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for the striking longshoremen to achieve their demands.  Economically, the 
white longshoremen could not afford to ignore the events occurring on the Mallory 
docks.16  This did not mean, however, that social equality had made the agenda.  As the 
meeting’s main speaker, the white Anderson reinforced the waterfront’s racial hierarchy.  
The two races of longshoremen might come together through labor organizations to 
protest the shipping companies’ tactics, but white union members would lead such 
movements.  For the duration of the strike, whites upheld their supremacy through the 
simple act of speaking for all Galveston’s coastwise longshoremen.17
 Local and state business interests recognized the race question as a potentially 
dividing force and willingly played it to their benefit.  Portraying the longshoremen and 
their organizations as forces of social equality between the races quickly became the 
most popular and effective method used.  During their June 2 conference with Hobby, 
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the representatives of the Texas Chamber of Commerce and Galveston Commercial 
Association used the race question to advance their argument for martial law.  Hoping to 
appeal to the governor’s racial prejudices, the committee reported that five blacks and 
four whites controlled the powerful Dock and Marine Council, which in turn controlled 
the waterfront unions of the port.  Hobby had to take control of Galveston before this 
unnatural and unreliable order spread throughout Texas.  Organized labor vehemently 
denied these charges, stating that “no man who knows the slightest thing about the Dock 
and Marine Council and the waterfront locals in Galveston would deliberately tell such a 
falsehood” unless he had a hidden agenda.18   
 The pro-business Daily News also raised racial question in order to show its 
support for state intervention.  Black strikebreakers working on the Morgan docks could 
not find shelter or food because “all the negroes living in Galveston are either members 
of or in sympathy with the unions and their houses are no sanctuary for non-union men.” 
Because of this, troops needed to remain on the island.  The paper also attempted to 
drive a wedge into the biracial solidarity of the longshoremen and weaken the strike.  In 
response to the waterfront’s growing number of black workers, white labor leaders were 
“trying to swing the balance of power further toward whites.”  The Daily News hoped 
that African-American workers would see their jobs on the Mallory line threatened by 
white unionists and abandon their fellow strikers.  When this strategy did not work, the 
paper grew even more blatant, publishing news of a strike-related killing by black 
Philadelphians under the misleading front page heading “Strikebreakers Kill Innocent 
By-Stander.”  The intentions of the editor could not be more transparent.  By associating 
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the black and white longshoremen with violence, public opinion would turn against their 
alliance and force a resolution.19
 Despite such attempts, the striking longshoremen maintained their allegiance to 
each other.  At another mass meeting held on June 4, a mixed crowd of fifteen hundred 
union members and local citizens adopted a resolution protesting the governor’s 
intention of sending troops to Galveston.  The protest, which also included 
approximately three to four hundred African-Americans, had little effect on Hobby’s 
decision.  Three days later, on June 7, more than a thousand soldiers arrived in the city 
and placed it under martial law.20   
 Although Hobby’s action proved damaging to the strike and organized labor in 
the long run, the military occupation of Galveston initially had the opposite effect on the 
biracialism of the longshoremen.  Instead of dividing the strikers and bringing public 
wrath upon them, the arrival of the National Guard brought the segregated unions closer 
together.  The growing militancy of the state’s business interests and their allies in 
Austin helped forge an even stronger alliance between the black and white 
longshoremen of Galveston.  Nothing illustrated this better than the dockworkers’ 
attitude toward the shipping companies’ use of Mexican strikebreakers. 
 Pragmatic considerations guided the biracial longshore movement in its dealings 
with Mexican strikebreakers.  The white and black longshoremen of Galveston both 
stood to lose when a third race began appearing on the docks.  Like most southern states, 
Texas considered itself a biracial society.  By the 1920s, however, it became obvious to 
many that Mexicans had entered this system and did not intend to leave.  Neither black 
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nor white culture showed much support for the members of this “in-between” race.  
Occupying an ambiguous position, Mexicans could enjoy the privileges of being white 
one day and suffer the worst features of Jim Crow segregation the next.  During hard 
times and conflicts such as the strike, the presence of these foreigners became a 
particularly sensitive subject.  For whites, Mexicans represented the deterioration of 
wages and conditions.  For African-Americans, they were competitors standing in the 
way of economic and social advancement.21
 Mexican immigration first became a heated issue in Texas during World War I, 
when labor shortages provided employers with the opportunity to import large numbers 
of these cheap workers.  The debate found new life in the early months of the strike.  At 
a regular meeting held in late April, the members of Local 385 voted unanimously to 
send a communication to Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson requesting an 
investigation of the state’s Mexican laborers.  The men claimed that many of the 
Mexican immigrants brought into Texas as farm laborers violated their contracts and 
moved to the cities after finishing the harvest, taking industrial jobs and undercutting the 
wages and conditions of American workers.  Local 385 wanted Secretary Wilson to 
investigate those Mexicans suspected of violating their contracts and deport them if 
found guilty.22
 Such charges gained even more support following Hobby’s declaration of martial 
law.  Days after the troops arrived, the Mallory line hired over two hundred Mexican 
strikebreakers and put them to work on the steamship Comal.  Although no one could 
provide conclusive evidence proving that these workers were imported from Mexico, 
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representatives of the longshoremen and the local labor movement spoke against their 
employment with a united voice.  In a June 7 meeting, the Dock and Marine Council 
devised methods for determining the residency and citizenship status of the 
strikebreakers.  The Union Review declared, in no uncertain terms, that “the wolf cry of 
a shortage of labor on the farms has been used as a subterfuge to get thousands of these 
cheap Mexican laborers into this country.”  The labor journal concluded, “We are for 
America first, last, and all the time, and the best is not too good for Americans and we 
say send these people back where they belong until they are willing to uphold what we 
have fought many years to gain, and not allow themselves to be used as tools by some 
money-grabbing corporation to the detriment of American citizens.23  Higher authorities 
also supported the longshoremen in their protest.  On June 14, the secretary of the AFL, 
Frank Morrison, announced his opposition to the importation of Mexicans and their use 
as strikebreakers.  Fred Davis, Texas’s Commissioner of Agriculture, also joined in 
denouncing the practice.24   
 Many who shared these sympathies tried using economic arguments to persuade 
the shipping companies to rethink their practices.  Several commentators argued that the 
employment of Mexican strikebreakers cost more money than it would take to rehire the 
regular longshoremen.  I.M. Barb, president of the Galveston Labor Council, stated that 
Mexicans were unsuited to longshore work.  It took them a week to accomplish what 
union men did in three days.  Using this same logic, Barb argued that it would be 
cheaper to employ one unionized, American worker at the slightly higher wage he 
demanded than three non-union Mexicans at pre-strike rates.  Barb also believed that the 
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companies had purposefully colonized the country’s industrial centers with Mexicans to 
help break strikes and lower wages.25  Other interested parties opposed the use of 
imported foreign workers by raising concerns about public health.  These critics claimed 
that many of the strikebreakers came from cities on the Gulf Coast of Mexico where 
bubonic plague epidemics had recently broken out.  Allowing such workers to remain in 
Galveston seriously endangered the health of the entire community.26  
 Supported by the National Guard and determined to maintain the movement of 
freight, the shipping companies and their business allies ignored these protests.  After 
completing work on the Comal, the Mallory line called for more non-union laborers to 
unload the incoming steamship Concho.  On June 15, Hobby’s private secretary Ralph 
Soape made his first visit to Galveston.  After investigating the docks and speaking with 
shipping officials, he confidently declared that all of the Mexican strikebreakers were 
long time local citizens and workers on the island.  If any of them had been imported, 
“he did not hear of it.”  Soape also used the Mexican replacements to justify the 
continuation of martial law, ironically claiming that the unskilled strikebreakers brought 
in to improve the situation were in fact responsible for the port’s poor shipping 
conditions.27
 After Soape’s departure, the National Guard continued to collect evidence 
defending its presence in Galveston.  Much of what it found revealed a strong current of 
biracial solidarity among the dockworkers, mostly directed against strikebreakers.  
Released on June 29, the final report of Major C.H. Machem’s court of inquiry described 
several instances of violence against non-union workers.  “On or about May 7,” the 
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report indicated, “a crowd of men, white and black, assaulted a Mexican going from the 
Mallory docks…When asked by a citizen what the trouble was, a man in the crowd 
answered, ‘The ___ __ _ _____ is a strikebreaker.’”  Potentially more serious, numerous 
witnesses testified to having seen racially-mixed groups of strikers attacking whites.  
According to one report, “a crowd of men—black and white—beat up a young white 
man.  He was knocked to the ground by two negroes while fifteen or twenty of the 
crowd stood by and saw it done.  Asked by a citizen what the trouble was, one of them 
replied, ‘Just beating up one of the scabs coming from the Mallory Line.’”  Machem’s 
report indicated that economic interests had overridden, at least temporarily, the 
traditional antagonism that existed between Galveston’s black and white 
longshoremen.28   
 Besides providing evidence in support of martial law, Machem’s report also 
served as powerful propaganda against the alliance of Local 385 and Local 807.  
African-American radicalism in the preceding years made southern whites more 
sensitive than ever to accounts of black-on-white violence.  By publishing the court’s 
findings, the National Guard attempted to use this widespread racial anxiety to its 
advantage.  Attacks on white and Mexican strikebreakers could just as easily spread to 
other citizens, while biracial union cooperation seemed to raise the spectre of social 
equality.29  By casting the strikers as racial outlaws, state authorities and their business 
allies hoped to ruin the longshoremen’s base of public support in Galveston.  Doing so 
could quickly end the strike and severely weaken the waterfront labor movement. 
 No one understood this better than Brigadier General Jacob F. Wolters.  
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Throughout his troops’ occupation of Galveston, the general repeatedly raised the issue 
of race in an effort to weaken the strike.  Much of this propaganda was quite transparent.  
Wolters made little effort to hide his contempt for the city’s African-American 
population, saying that “there is a class of negroes in Galveston more insolent and 
defiant than any [he had] met anywhere in Texas.”  The membership of so many 
disobedient blacks in the city’s labor unions only made the strike situation more 
dangerous.  Hoping to provoke white indignation, Wolters claimed that these same 
African-Americans elected his uncooperative opponents in city hall.  Although this 
accusation had little basis in reality—only a small handful of black Galvestonians 
enjoyed the right to participate in local elections—it was an effective weapon to use 
against the municipal administration’s supporters in the labor movement.  By making it 
appear that the city government and its union advocates violated white racial supremacy, 
Wolters cast serious doubts on both and justified the Guard’s continued presence.  Labor 
representatives responded with a feeble statement proclaiming that none of the striking 
longshoremen were black.  This bitter and misleading answer illustrated the tenuousness 
of waterfront biracialism.  Whites might join with blacks as workers, but socially and 
politically, they still sought to uphold the superiority of their race.30     
 Wolters also used white fears of African-American radicalism to his advantage in 
weakening the strike.  On June 29, the general made a stunning announcement. 
Intelligence indicated that Galveston’s black residents had recently begun gathering 
weapons and ammunition in large quantities.  In light of this discovery, Wolters ordered 
the removal of all ammunition from the city’s pawn shops.  Galveston’s African-
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American population responded indignantly, denouncing the general for his attempt to 
“stir up race trouble” and vehemently denying all accusations.  Outside of the black 
community, this propaganda failed to have its intended effect.  Perhaps believing it to be 
false, leading white newspapers, including the Daily News, did not print the story.  
Although Galvestonians could not have known it at the time, the findings of federal 
investigators indicated that Wolters exaggerated his claims.  Their reports showed that 
many blacks in Houston attempted to buy ammunition, but made no mention of similar 
purchases in Galveston.  Although the record contains no direct evidence, the general 
may have been prompted to make his own announcement after receiving word of these 
discoveries by phone.  Inaccurate or not, the danger of Wolters’ accusation lay in the 
public suspicions it generated against the strike.  Whites simply could not afford to 
ignore any indication of African-American militancy, especially when many of the 
alleged perpetrator walked beside them on the picket line.31
 The biracial solidarity of Galveston’s coastwise unions reached its climax in the 
midst of this battle for public opinion.  As the end of summer approached, a resolution of 
the strike favorable to the longshoremen appeared unlikely.  At an August 15 meeting 
between locals 385, 807, 1113, and 1024, the men agreed to resume work on two 
conditions: submission of their wage demands to arbitration, and, more importantly, the 
immediate discharge of all non-union workers.  After the companies removed their 
strikebreakers, the regular black and white longshoremen intended to return to their 
separate racial enclaves at the Morgan and Mallory docks.  With high hopes, the locals 
submitted this proposal to both shipping companies the following day.32   
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 On August 20, the companies responded with their own conditions for 
reemployment.  Besides accepting their pre-strike wages, the longshoremen had to also 
agree to three terms if they wanted their jobs back: the employment of all clerks and 
foremen at company discretion, the removal of union delegates from dock activities, and 
an open-shop policy of non-discrimination in hiring.  From now on, the companies 
declared, no one race could claim a particular dock as its private sanctuary.  Black, 
white, and Mexican would have to learn to work alongside one another.  These proposals 
shocked the strikers.  Demonstrating a total disregard for white racial supremacy and 
social hierarchy, Galveston’s shipping companies and the business interests they 
represented indicated once more that they intended to break the back of organized labor 
at all costs.33   
 The striking longshoremen wasted no time rejecting this proposal and quickly 
reasserted their original wage demands.  Representatives of organized labor responded 
just as vigorously.  One union official declared, “I, for one, will never open my mouth in 
favor of agreeing to such un-American terms as those submitted by the steamship 
companies, which would displace American citizens in favor of alien peons who are 
absolutely without any desire for a decent standard of living, and who pass their lives 
huddled together under their filthy ponchos when they are not at work.34  Another union 
member passionately claimed that anyone with the true interest of Galveston at heart 
would shudder at the employment of these “disease carriers.”  An article in the Houston 
Press offered perhaps the most astute commentary on the companies’ proposal, saying 
that three races were now involved in a problem that previously concerned only two.  
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“The Mexican…comes to the island with the status of the white man and his privileges 
are the same in all public places,” the paper declared.  “To win a point, the employers of 
Galveston are making strides.  It is undeniable: but who can measure the cost?”35
 Neither company paid attention to these protests, rejecting the union demands 
without further discussion.  On August 25, Mallory officials issued an ultimatum to the 
strikers.  The conditions for reemployment would remain on the table, they declared, but 
no more negotiations would take place.  If the men wanted their jobs, they must accept 
the open-shop conditions without debate.  The fate of Galveston’s biracial waterfront 
unionism lay entirely in the hands of the longshoremen themselves.   
*  *  *  * 
 Since the beginning of the coastwise strike in March 1920, Galveston’s 
longshoremen confronted many challenges.  Throughout the months, the island’s 
waterfront unions felt the iron heel of military repression, witnessed the establishment of 
an open-shop in their once strongly organized city, and became the targets of vicious 
racial propaganda.  Few would contest that that the business interests behind these first 
two assaults had been successful, but the final question of race still appeared undecided.  
Biracial solidarity on the docks had withstood the slings and arrows of its opponents, 
culminating in August with the longshoremen’s rejection of the Mallory line’s 
ultimatums.  In Texas’s racially charged atmosphere, however, this alliance could only 
endure for so long before it eventually broke.   
 The split finally occurred on December 13, 1920.  Following two months of 
negotiation, representatives of Local 807 signed an agreement allowing their members to 
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resume work on the Mallory line.  The Galveston citizen’s committee, which had 
acquired significant standing in September after devising a plan for the removal of 
troops, stood at the heart of this resolution.  Most of the terms in the new agreement 
mirrored those offered by the shipping companies in August.  Pending their acceptance 
of non-discrimination in hiring, the prohibition of union delegates, and the employment 
of foremen and clerks at company discretion, the strikers could return to work at a rate of 
$0.67 an hour regular time and $1.00 overtime.  The settlement also established new 
grievance procedures.  In the future, all disagreements between the company and its 
employees would be immediately directed to the attention of the citizen’s committee for 
arbitration.  Two days later, over a hundred of the striking longshoremen returned to 
their jobs at the Mallory docks for the first time since March.  Another large group of 
men followed this example the next day, prompting Mallory shipping agent F.T. Rennie 
to declare that “Conditions…are practically restored to normal.”36   
 In terms of its members success or failure in the strike, the agreement proved 
ambiguous for Local 807.  On the one hand, the new grievance procedures severely 
weakened the union.  Individual workers and the citizen’s committee now acted as the 
arbiters of disagreements and replaced the union as the spokesperson for the 
longshoremen.  Although wages increased, the new pay scale represented a defeat as 
well.  Far from what the union originally demanded and carrying no provision for further 
arbitration, it would likely stand for sometime.  In one respect, however, the strike 
settlement offered a partial victory for Galveston’s black coastwise longshoremen.  
Contrary to its policy of non-discrimination in hiring, the Mallory line announced its 
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intention of employing only African-American labor on its docks.  As a sign of good 
faith, the company discharged all Mexican strikebreakers on December 15.  The 
members of Local 807 saw this as a minor triumph.  Despite the damage done to their 
union, they retained possession of their traditional racial enclave.  If the white 
longshoremen could obtain a similar resolution, biracial unionism might endure on the 
waterfront.37   
 Events on the Morgan-Southern Pacific docks soon shattered this illusion.  
Shortly after the Mallory settlement, Morgan shipping agent H.M. Wilkins offered his 
striking workers identical terms.  In exchange for a small increase in wages, the men of 
Local 385 had to agree to open-shop conditions if they wanted to be rehired.  It is likely 
that had Wilkins followed Rennie’s example and restored his company’s former policy 
of employing only whites, a settlement would have been easily forthcoming.  There 
seemed to be little hope that Local 385 could bring about a successful conclusion of the 
strike alone.  Wilkins, however, entertained different ideas.  Instead of offering to 
discharge its force of black and Mexican strikebreakers, the Morgan line stood firm on 
its policy of non-discrimination.  Formerly the exclusive domain of white longshoremen, 
the Southern Pacific docks suddenly became a potential arena for racial mixing.38
 This challenge sounded the death knell of biracial waterfront unionism in 
Galveston.  Willing to accept all of the company’s other terms for reemployment, the 
members of Local 385 adamantly refused to return to work until they received a 
guarantee that blacks and whites would not be integrated.  Wilkins offered a similarly 
stubborn response.  “It was to our great regret that the white men left us as they did,” he 
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declared, “but the present situation is one brought on by themselves.”  At the Southern 
Pacific docks in New Orleans and the shops in Houston, black and white worked 
together without trouble, he claimed.  The Morgan line did not intend to mix the races, 
but reserved the right to do so if conditions made it necessary.  “Our present 
dockworkers, numbering several hundred men, less than ten percent of whom are white, 
voluntarily came to the rescue of the Morgan line and its patrons when the company was 
in distress,” Wilkins continued.  Negotiating a contract that excluded either race from 
employment would not only be a violation of laws upholding the free pursuit of one’s 
business, but also an insult to the company’s recent saviors.39   
 The Morgan line’s racial policies received strong denunciations from Local 385 
and the citizen’s committee.  Contradicting Wilkins’ claim, O.A. Anderson declared that 
Texas’s Jim Crow laws prohibited whites from working side by side with blacks.  “The 
laboring men have agreed to every proposition asked by the Morgan line,” he 
announced, “but are not going to shoulder a truck with the negroes.”  Other white union 
men argued that 80 percent of Galveston’s dockworkers would be black if the Morgan 
line opened its docks to all races.  Such an imbalance threatened to overturn the port’s 
racial hierarchy.  At a conference held January 22, a representative of Local 385 
declared that “we pleaded with Mr. Wilkins, not as union men, but as white men” to 
reconsider the company’s position.  The citizen’s committee also expressed its 
disapproval of the Southern Pacific’s actions, saying that it would be wrong for the 
people of Texas and Galveston to further protect the company if it insisted on mixing the 
races, “a fundamentally wrong and unsound practice.”  “There can be no condition of 
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harmony existing here by the mixing of the races,” the committee declared.40
 Wilkins intransigence also drew the public’s wrath.  The Daily News 
editorialized that the Morgan line should recognize the impracticality of race-mixing and 
end the strike by employing one group or the other exclusively.  Because whites 
formerly worked the docks, “The News ventures to offer the hope that white men will be 
reemployed.”  County Judge E.B. Holman argued that “the mixing of blacks and whites 
on the dock is bound to lead to trouble later on.”  Blacks belonged in the cotton field, not 
“the white man’s town” of Galveston.  Chief of Police Sedgewick agreed with Holman, 
declaring ominously that “to have negroes in a subordinate position will probably work 
to advantage, but to mix the whites in positions similar to those held by negroes and to 
work the gangs intermixed is a sure sign of racial trouble that will never be stamped out 
in the South.”  The concern for this situation reached all the way to Austin, where the 
state’s newly inaugurated governor Pat Neff decided not to withdraw Captain Joe 
Brooks and his force of Texas Rangers until the Morgan line completely settled the 
strike and these racial questions.41
 Despite the public opposition that this blatant disregard for contemporary racial 
standards caused, the Morgan-Southern Pacific line did not fear reprisal.  Even after the 
members of Local 385 appealed to Governor Neff for assistance, the company stood 
steadfast behind Wilkins and its open-shop policy of non-discrimination.  This 
unprecedented turn of events dumbfounded the white longshoremen.  Although they had 
become aware months before that the strike would not be settled to their advantage, no 
one ever expected the waterfront’s racial order to be completely overturned.  The only 
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leverage these men enjoyed—their whiteness—meant little to company officials eager to 
end the strike.  By allowing African-Americans to dominate the coastwise workforce, 
the Morgan and Mallory lines successfully played the black and white longshore locals 
off one another and divided the strike along racial lines.  Without this solidarity, 
Galveston’s longshoremen had no hope of success against their powerful opponents.  
Local 385 realized this at the end of January 1921 and grudgingly accepted the Morgan 
line’s conditions for reemployment.  On the morning of February 1, a small number of 
white coastwise longshoremen returned to their jobs alongside the non-union black 
workers who replaced them for ten months.42    
 There was no up side in Local 385’s final settlement to match the agreement 
reached between Local 807 and the Mallory line.  Besides operating under the open-shop 
and losing their wage demands, the white Southern Pacific workers now faced the very 
real prospect of racial competition for employment.  Neither their whiteness nor their 
union membership could guarantee them a paycheck on the coastwise docks.  It 
appeared to many that Galveston’s African-American workers had gained the upper 
hand, but ultimately, both races lost.  As pragmatic and passive as it may have been, the 
cooperation that existed between the black and white longshoremen proved to be one of 
their greatest assets during the strike.  Besides preserving peace on the waterfront for 
many years, this racial solidarity also guided Local 385 and Local 807 against 
strikebreakers, military occupation, and the open-shop for a full nine months.  Once the 
companies managed to undermine these commitments, the unions’ loyalties to one 
another quickly broke.  When ILA leaders declared the strike off on February 1, 1921, 
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all that remained of this impressive biracial union system was the faint hope of 
rebuilding it someday.  What had once been Texas’s most strongly unionized waterfront 
became the site of racial conflict, discrimination, and a hostile open-shop.  For 
Galveston’s shipping companies and business interests, the remainder of the 1920s 
would be a time of prosperity and change.  For the longshoremen and their unions, the 
decade promised only an endless struggle for survival. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 On September 15, 1920, Governor William P. Hobby issued a call for a special 
session of the Texas Legislature.  The stated purpose was to “protect the ballot boxes” 
and eliminate any discrimination that might occur against newly-enfranchised female 
voters in the November elections.  Most Texans realized, however, that the real issue at 
hand was the Galveston longshoremen’s strike.  Alongside Hobby’s announcement, the 
Galveston Daily News speculated “Lawmakers Will Also be Asked to Consider Cheaper 
Way ‘To Keep Commerce Open’ at Galveston.”  Some commentators put great faith in 
the upcoming session, declaring the legislature to be a voice of reason that would restore 
free government in Texas.  Lawmakers rudely shattered these hopes when they convened 
in Austin on September 21.1
 The day prior to the session, state legislators received copies of a new bill that 
sought to prevent a future recurrence of the labor troubles in Galveston.  Hobby’s “Open 
Port Bill,” as the press dubbed it, declared that because the ports of Texas operated at 
public expense, state law should prevent any obstruction or hindrance to their operation.  
In order to keep commerce moving, the bill made it a felony “for any person or group of 
persons by physical violence, or by threatening to use physical violence, or by 
intimidation to, or by harassing or molesting or in any way to interfere with men 
engaged in loading or unloading ships at any port in Texas.”  Defining harassment very 
broadly, something as simple as a conversation between a striker and strikebreaker could 
technically be considered illegal.  In addition to this, the governor gained the right to 
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assume and exercise full control over the police force in any area where these conditions 
existed without making an expensive declaration of martial law.  Offenders arrested by 
state officials would be subject to a change of venue to a location no more than one 
hundred miles away from the site of their offense.  Written ostensibly to guarantee 
defendants a fair trial, in reality this provision insured prosecution.  Hoping to speed its 
own passage, the bill’s final section read, “The importance of the legislation proposed, 
and the short term of this special session, creates an emergency and imperative public 
necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three separate days be 
suspended, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and so 
it is enacted.”  Following the formal presentation of the bill to committee on September 
21, Hobby sent several messages to both houses of the legislature outlining the history of 
the Galveston strike and urging members to vote favorably. 2
 Organized labor’s legislative supporters offered stiff resistance to the proposed 
law, which they labeled Hobby’s “Anti-Strike Bill.”  Galveston representative Lee Brady 
argued that the bill represented an attempt to legitimize Hobby’s recent actions.  He also 
declared sarcastically, “If we are going to forbid strikes, let’s do it directly and not pass 
such a makeshift measure as this.”  House Speaker R.E. Thomason of El Paso joined 
Brady in denouncing the bill, saying “I am for law and order everywhere in Texas but 
not for any legislation that singles out a certain class and imposes a certain law on that 
class.”3  As expected, representatives of labor strongly disapproved of the proposed law.  
In a lengthy speech before the Senate, Texas State Federation of Labor (TSFL) president 
George Slater fumed that the bill came close to making him “a red flagger.”  “Organized 
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labor will not admit the striker, battling economically for more bread and butter for his 
wife and babies, is a more despicable type of criminal than the murderer or thief,” he 
cried.  “We are going to claim for the striker all the rights common criminals claim.”  
The Houston Labor Journal remained confident that the bill would not become law, 
saying that “no sane body of lawmakers could afford to place such a measure in the 
statutes of their State, and it denounces the very platform that Governor Hobby is 
pledged as a democrat to support.”4
 Apparently disregarding the Journal’s assessment of its mental health, the Senate 
reported favorably on the Open Port Bill after making a few minor amendments to its 
provisions on punishment.5  Business leaders and chambers of commerce from around 
the state inundated the legislature with telegrams urging final passage, saying that the 
public interests of all Texans depended on it.  Pro-business newspapers also voiced their 
approval.  “A longshoremen’s strike must rely for its success largely not so much on 
violence as on the institution of a reign of terror,” the Daily News affirmed.  “It is 
because this bill would provide a more effective and prompt method of ending a reign of 
terror…that it is thought ‘dangerous’ to many of those who join in the outcry against 
it.”6   
 Legislative proponents of the bill responded to these entreaties, arguing on the 
floor of the House that the presence of so many foreigners, African-Americans, 
Bolsheviks, and anarchists in Galveston made passage of the bill and the current military 
occupation more necessary than ever.  Several representatives attempted to add 
amendments to the bill, but the suggestions of Waco representative Newton Williams 
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proved to be the most important and far reaching.  Rather than limit the bill to the 
commerce of ships and railroads, Williams proposed that all common carriers engaged in 
the transportation of freight or passengers be protected as well.  This included interurban 
railways, streetcars and express lines, and pipeline companies.  After a fierce debate, the 
amendment carried.  On September 30, the same day that martial law ended in 
Galveston, the House voted 77 to 25 in favor of the strengthened bill.  Following a brief 
conference session between the two legislative branches, Hobby signed the Open Port 
Bill on October 4, making into law “the most drastic anti-strike bill that ever passed a 
legislature.”7   
*  *  *  * 
 Although the Galveston strike continued for another four months, the passage of 
Hobby’s Open Port Law in October 1920 provided its unofficial conclusion.  The 
striking dockworkers no longer entertained hopes of successfully resolving the conflict.  
When the law became effective on January 1, 1921, it completely circumscribed the 
actions of an already divided waterfront labor movement.  Organized labor showed its 
disapproval of this assault by withdrawing support from the traitorous Democratic Party, 
but the state’s most firmly entrenched political force paid no attention to their feeble 
protests.8  Supported by an anti-labor state government, the shipping companies and 
their business allies held all the cards.  Galveston’s longshoremen had no choice but to 
accept the companies’ open-shop terms and dream of better days. Unfortunately, the 
realization of these hopes remained years away. 
 Simply put, the strike was disastrous for Galveston’s coastwise longshoremen 
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and their unions.  In the aftermath of the conflict, Texas’s most strongly organized city 
and its waterfront became a hotbed of open-shop employers and anti-labor sentiment.  
Forced to accept non-discrimination in hiring, Locals 385 and 807 lost all leverage on 
the waterfront.  Once employment became a contract between an employer and an 
individual worker, the “right-to-work” cut out all union intermediaries.  Without union 
stewards and foremen to police the waterfront, working conditions rested entirely in the 
companies’ hands.   
 The strike also destroyed the Galveston longshoremen’s fragile biracial 
solidarity.  When the Morgan line replaced its white members with non-union black 
labor, Local 385 could do little more than voice their disapproval.  By 1930, African-
Americans accounted for nearly 70 percent of the workers in Texas’s longshore industry, 
up from 54 percent in 1920.  Racially divided and subject to the open-shop, Galveston’s 
coastwise locals eventually yielded their charters in 1922.  Through employee loans and 
planned social functions, both of which became mandatory conditions of one’s 
continued employment, the companies successfully used welfare capitalism to prevent 
their workers from organizing again.  In 1924, company unions formed, providing the 
only form of organization for Galveston’s coastwise longshoremen well into the 1930s.  
As late as 1936, ILA member Nick Macela claimed that neither the Mallory nor the 
Morgan line workers had organized independently since the end of the strike.9   
 This weakened position became obvious very soon after the strike ended in 
February 1921.  At the ILA’s annual convention in July, recovery occupied an important 
position on the union’s list of priorities.  Early in the proceedings, the Executive Council 
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received a request from M.J. Gahagan of Local 385 recommending remittance of his 
union’s taxes for the previous year.  Because of the strike, the local’s remaining 
members could not pay their dues.  Following this, union members from across the 
South joined representatives from Galveston and asked the ILA to take action against the 
Southern Pacific line.  Their resolution read:  
 Resolved, That the incoming Executive Council of the Longshoremen’s 
 Association be instructed to take this matter up with the General Officers of the 
 Southern Pacific Steamship Company at New York and use their best efforts in 
 remedying this practice to the end that all discrimination against the members of 
 our organization cease, and they be given an equal opportunity in the hiring of 
 men employed on the docks and piers of said Company, both at Galveston, Texas 
 and New Orleans, Louisiana.10
 
Disregarding the terms it had dictated for reemployment, the shipping company refused 
to hire union members.  No sooner had the men placed this problem before the 
convention than word of another setback arrived from Galveston.  On July 14, Mallory 
officials announced that they would lower wages to the pre-strike levels of $0.60 an hour 
regular and $0.90 overtime.  They also intended to increase the work day from eight to 
ten hours.  Dissatisfied with this arrangement, the president of Local 807 asked what 
course of action he should take.  He received a disheartening response.  Although the 
ILA strictly opposed the increase in hours, the Mallory workers should accept the pay 
cut without debate.  Having already lost one dispute over wages, the union could not 
afford to start a new campaign.11   
 Galveston’s longshoremen did not hold a monopoly on this kind of high-handed 
treatment by their employers.  All across Texas, workers and their unions came under 
attack from business interests and the state government.  The open-shop was so 
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successful, argued historian James Maroney, “that the organized business interests could 
boast that they had made greater progress in the anti-union campaign in Texas than in 
any other state in the country.”  Oil workers, machinists, and building trade employees 
found themselves dismissed from jobs for their membership in unions.  Retreating from 
its earlier strategy of legislative reform, the TSFL hardly functioned during the decade.  
From 50,000 members in 1920, the Federation declined to just over 25,000 by 1927.  
Biracial unionism and cooperation also fell victim to the 1920s.  With the TSFL 
repeatedly denying their delegates seats at its annual convention, African-American 
unionists warned that industries like longshoring would soon belong exclusively to non-
union labor.12   
 By institutionalizing the open-shop, Hobby’s Open-Port law greatly facilitated 
this assault on the working class.  The most dramatic example of its use came in July 
1922, when several thousand Texas members of the Federated Railroad Shopmen’s 
Union joined 400,000 of their fellows in a nationwide strike for higher pay.  After 
violence broke out between strikers and strikebreakers in the town of Denison, Governor 
Pat Neff invoked the Open Port Law there and in sixteen other cities affected by the 
strike.  When the Texas Rangers failed to keep order, Neff followed the path of his 
predecessor and declared martial law in the North Texas town.  Following injunctions 
and similar military actions elsewhere in the nation, many of the shopmen returned to 
work.  Ultimately, however, the strike cost their union more than 125,000 members.  
Although the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals later declared it unconstitutional in 1926, 
the invocation of the Open Port Law in breaking the shopmen’s strike indicated 
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organized labor’s waning status in the state.13   
 Contrary to those who argue for Texas’s exceptionalism, the decline of organized 
labor in the state was not a unique phenomenon.  Workers in Texas suffered the 
consequences of a larger trend seen across the nation in the 1920s.  Although pay 
envelopes increased in size by 11 percent between 1923 and 1929, this did not come 
close to matching the 60 percent increase in profits and dividends that corporations and 
their stockholders earned.  By the end of the so-called “Prosperity Decade,” it has been 
estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of Americans did not earn enough to provide 
their families with a decent standard of living.  Unemployment became a chronic 
problem, averaging over 10 percent for most of the decade.  Organized labor suffered 
huge losses in union membership, falling from a high of just over 5 million in 1920 to 
3.4 million in 1929.14  As historian David Montgomery so aptly argued: 
 The hostile stance of the state toward labor’s demands after 1918, its policies of 
 deregulation and deflation, the ubiquitous repression by local, state, and federal 
 police, and above all the mounting toll of unemployed—first at the end of 1918, 
 more  devastatingly during the 1920-2 depression, and then endemic to industrial 
 life through the Coolidge Prosperity—all fostered an environment in which open-
 shop drives could hurl back the union tide in virtually every city of the land.15
   
Open-shop movements, welfare capitalism, and outright repression made the prospect of 
joining a union, in Texas and every other state, less than desirable to most American 
workers in the “Roaring Twenties.”  Boarded up and in disrepair, the house that labor 
built remained unoccupied by all but a few of the most hopeful until the late 1930s. 
 
 
 
 157
 
 
Notes 
 
1  Galveston Daily News, September 16, 1920; Houston Press, September 18, 1920; 
and James A. Clark, The Tactful Texan: A Biography of Governor Will Hobby (New 
York:  Random House, 1958), 136. 
 
2  Galveston Daily News, September 21, 1920; Houston Post, September 21, 1920; 
and Houston Press, September 21, 22, 1920.  The Daily News carried the full text of 
Hobby’s proposed law in its pages. 
 
3  Houston Press, September 22, 23, 1920.  The Press echoed Representative 
Brady’s comments, editorializing, “The governor, so far as the equity of his act is 
concerned, might just as well have gone farther and suggested a criminal law making it a 
felony for longshoremen to strike at all.” 
 
4  Houston Press, September 23, 1920 (quote); and Houston Labor Journal, 
September 25, 1920. 
 
5  The Senate changed the penalties stated in the bill from a felony offense, 
punishable by one to five years in the state penitentiary, to a misdemeanor, punishable 
by 30 days to one year in county jail.  See Houston Press, September 23, 1920; and 
Houston Post, September 24, 1920. 
 
6  Houston Press, September 27, 1920; and Galveston Daily News, September 25, 
1920.  The Houston Post also voiced its approval of the Open Port Bill, arguing  “the 
question involved in the hobby bill touches one of law and order and inviolable human 
rights, to say nothing of the broader question of public rights, and it is the province of 
the legislature to impose such lawful restrictions as may be necessary to preserve order 
and protect such rights.”  See Houston Post, September 26, 1920. 
 
7  Galveston Daily News, September 24, 26, 28, 30, October 2, 3, 1920; Houston 
Post, September 29, October 3, 1920; Clark, The Tactful Texan, 137; and Houston Press, 
September 28, 29, 30 (quote), October 3, 1920. 
 
8  Union Review, October 22, 1920.  In issuing its protest against the Texas 
Democracy, the TSFL urged organized labor to overlook its political loyalties and 
affiliations in the upcoming election and vote for a third party, the American Party.  
Despite this impassioned call, Democrats soundly carried the November election just as 
they had done since the end of Reconstruction. 
 
9  Ernest Obadele-Starks, Black Unionism in the Industrial South (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 45, 48; Albert Anderson, “Interview by 
 
 158
 
Anonymous,” July 13, 1936, Labor Movement in Texas Collection, Center for American 
History, The University of Texas at Austin (hereafter cited as CAH); Doc Hamilton, 
“Interview by Anonymous,” July 8, 1936, CAH; and Nick Macela, “Interview by 
Anonymous,” July 8, 1936, CAH.  Lizabeth Cohen deals with the corporate strategy of 
welfare capitalism at great length in Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in 
Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
10  International Longshoremen’s Association, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth 
Convention (1921), 183.  Emphasis added. 
 
11  ILA, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Convention, 139, 215-16.  By the time 
Nick Macela was interviewed in 1936, the Galveston longshoremen’s wage had declined 
even further.  Although the regular pay rate remained at $0.60 an hour, overtime pay had 
declined to only $0.70 an hour.  See Nick Macela, “Interview,” CAH. 
 
12  James Maroney, “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929” (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Houston, 1975), 222-23, 229-31. 
 
13  Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas Politics, 1921-
1928 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984), 82-86; Robert Justin 
Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976 (Urbana: 
Illinois University Press, 2001), 188-89; and Maroney, “Organized Labor in Texas,” 
224-27. 
 
14  Goldstein, Political Repression, 170-71, 184-85. 
 
15  David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, 
and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 453. 
 
 
 159
REFERENCES 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Archival Material 
Galveston Wharf Company Records, 1854-1943. Galveston and Texas History Center. 
 Rosenberg Library, Galveston, TX. 
Gilbert Mers Collection. Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Houston Public 
 Library, Houston, TX. 
International Longshoremen’s Association (Screwmen’s Benevolent Association), Local 
 310, 317, and 307 Records. Texas Labor Archives, The University of Texas at 
 Arlington. 
Labor Movement in Texas Collection. Center for American History, The University of 
 Texas at Austin. 
Political Broadsides and Circulars. Galveston and Texas History Center. Rosenberg 
 Library, Galveston, TX. 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association Records, 1866-1922. Center for American History, 
 The University of Texas at Austin.  
Werlin, Rosella Horowitz.  Papers. General Correspondence, 1906-1941. Galveston and 
 Texas History Center. Rosenberg Library, Galveston, TX. 
 
Convention Proceedings 
International Longshoremen’s Association. Proceedings of the Annual Conventions, 
 1913-14, 1921. 
 
 160
Government Documents and Reports 
Bureau of the Census. Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920—State 
 Compendium: Texas. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1925. 
Hobby, William Pettus. Records. Letterpress Books, 1920-1921. Texas State Library and 
 Archives Division, Austin, TX. 
Kornweibel, Theodore Jr., ed. Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, 1917-1925: The 
 First World War, the Red Scare, and the Garvey Movement. Frederick, MD: 
 University Publications of America, 1986. Microfilm.  
Texas Adjutant General’s Department. Adjutant General’s Correspondence, 1920-1921. 
 Texas State Library and Archives Division, Austin, TX. 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Galveston Daily News 
Houston Labor Journal 
Houston Post 
Houston Press 
Union Review 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books  
Alexander, Charles C. Crusade for Conformity: The Ku Klux Klan in Texas, 1920-1930. 
 Houston: Texas Gulf Coast Historical Association, 1962.  
 
 161
Allen, Ruth. Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas. Austin: University of 
 Texas Press, 1941. 
_____. East Texas Lumber Workers: An Economic and Social Picture, 1870-1950. 
 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. 
Arnesen, Eric. Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-
 1923. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Barnes, Charles B. The Longshoremen. New York: Survey Associates, 1915. 
Brown, Norman. Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas Politics, 1921-1928. 
 College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984. 
Buenger, Walter and Robert Calvert, ed. Texas Through Time: Evolving 
 Interpretations. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991. 
Clark, James A. The Tactful Texan: A Biography of Governor Will Hobby. New York: 
 Random House, 1958. 
Cohen, Lizabeth.  Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Foley, Neil. The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton 
 Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
Goldstein, Robert Justin. Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976. 
 Urbana: Illinois University Press, 2001. 
Goodwyn, Lawrence. Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America. New 
 York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
Gould, Lewis L. Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era. 
 
 162
 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973. 
Green, James. Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest, 1895-1943. 
 Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978. 
Greenberg, Stanley B. Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative 
 Perspectives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980. 
Gutman, Herbert. Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in 
 American Working-Class and Social History. New York: Random House, 1976. 
Hardwick, Susan Wiley. Mythic Galveston: Reinventing America’s Third Coast. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 
Harris, William H. The Harder We Run: Black Workers Since the Civil War. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Kazin, Michael. Barons of Labor: San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in 
 the Progressive Era. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987. 
Kelly, Brian. Race, Class, and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-1921. Urbana: 
 University of Illinois Press, 2001. 
Krenek, Harry. The Power Vested: The Use of Martial Law and the National Guard in 
 Texas Domestic Crisis, 1919-1932. Austin: Presidial Press, 1980. 
Letwin, Daniel. The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878-
 1921. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 
Marshall, F. Ray. Labor in the South. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
McCartin, Joseph A. Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the 
 Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-1921. Chapel Hill: 
 
 163
 University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
McComb, David G. Galveston: A History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. 
Mers, Gilbert. Working the Waterfront: The Ups and Downs of a Rebel Longshoreman. 
 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988. 
Montgomery, David. The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
 American Labor Activism, 1865-1925. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
 Press,  1987. 
Nelson, Bruce. Divided We Stand: American Workers and the Struggle for Black 
 Equality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Obadele-Starks, Ernest.  Black Unionism in the Industrial South. College Station: Texas 
 A&M University Press, 2000. 
Reed, Merl E., Leslie S. Hough, and Gary M. Fink, ed. Southern Workers and Their 
 Unions, 1880-1975: Selected Papers, The Second Southern Labor History 
 Conference, 1978. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. 
Rosenberg, Daniel. New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism, 1892-1923. 
 Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988. 
Rubin, Lester. The Negro in the Longshore Industry. Philadelphia: University of 
 Pennsylvania Press, 1974. 
Russell, Maud. Men Along the Shore. New York: Brussel & Brussel, 1966. 
Spero, Sterling and Abram Harris. The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor 
 Movement. 1930. Reprint, New York: Atheneum, 1969. 
Spratt, John S. The Road to Spindletop: Economic Change in Texas, 1875-1901. Dallas: 
 
 164
 Southern Methodist University Press, 1955. 
Stokes, Melvyn and Rick Halpern, eds. Race and Class in the American South Since 
 1890. Oxford: Berg, 1994. 
Tindall, George B. The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945. Baton Rouge: 
 Louisiana State University Press, 1967. 
Tomlins, Christopher L. The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the 
 Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1985.  
Winslow, Calvin, ed. Waterfront Workers: New Perspectives on Race and Class. 
 Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998. 
Wolters, Jacob F.  Martial Law and its Administration. Austin: Gamel’s Book Store, 
 1930. 
Woodward, C. Van. Origins of the New South, 1877-1913. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
 State University Press, 1971. 
Zamora, Emilio.  The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas. College Station: Texas 
 A&M University Press, 1993. 
Zeiger, Robert H, ed. Organized Labor in the Twentieth Century South. Knoxville: 
 University of Tennessee Press, 1991. 
Journal Articles 
Angel, William D. Jr. “Controlling the Workers: The Galveston Dock Workers’ Strike 
 of 1920 and its Impact on Labor Relations in Texas.” East Texas Historical
 Journal 23 (1985): 14-26.  
 
 165
Arnesen, Eric. “Following the Color Line of Labor: Black Workers and the Labor 
 Movement Before 1930.” Radical History Review 55 (Winter 1993): 53-87. 
_____. “‘What’s On the Black Worker’s Mind?’ African-American Workers and the 
 Union Tradition.” Gulf Coast Historical Review 10 (Fall 1994): 5-17. 
Draper, Alan. “The New Southern Labor History Revisited: The Success of the Mine, 
 Mill, and Smelter Workers Union in Birmingham, 1934-1938.” Journal of 
 Southern History 62 (February 1996): 87-108. 
Fields, Barbara J. “Ideology and Race in American History.” In Region, Race, and 
 Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Van Woodward, edited by J. Morgan 
 Kousser and James M. McPherson, 143-77. New York: Oxford, 1982. 
Greene, Casey. “Guardians Against Change: The Ku Klux Klan in Houston and Harris
 County, 1920-1925.” Houston Review 10 (1988): 3-20. 
Hill, Herbert.  “Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine 
 Workers of America.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2 
 (Winter 1988): 132-200. 
Kimeldorf, Howard. “Bringing Unions Back In (Or Why We Need a New Old Labor 
 History).” Labor History 32 (Winter 1991): 91-129. 
Kimeldorf, Howard and Robert Penney. “‘Excluded’ By Choice: Dynamics of Interracial 
 Unionism on the Philadelphia Waterfront, 1910-1930.” International Labor and 
 Working Class History 51 (Spring 1997): 50-71. 
Maroney, James C. “The International Longshoremen’s Association in the Gulf States 
 during the Progressive Era.” Southern Studies 16 (Summer 1977): 225-32.  
 
 166
_____. “The Galveston Longshoremen’s Strike of 1920.” East Texas Historical Journal 
 16 (1978): 34-38. 
Marshall, F. Ray. “Some Reflection on Labor History.” Southwestern Historical 
 Quarterly 75 (October 1971): 137-57.  
Norwood, Stephen H. “Bogalusa Burning: The War Against Biracial Unionism in the 
 Deep South, 1919.” Journal of Southern History 63 (August 1997): 591-628. 
Reese, James V. “The Early History of Labor Organization in Texas, 1838-1876.” 
 Southwestern Historical Quarterly 72 (July 1968): 1-20.  
_____. “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union: The Screwmen’s Benevolent 
 Association of Galveston, 1866-1891.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 75 
 (October 1971): 158-85. 
Reich, Steven A. “Soldiers of Democracy: Black Texans and the Fight for Citizenship, 
 1917-1921.” Journal of American History 82 (March 1996): 1478-1504. 
Wakstein, Allen M. “The Origins of the Open Shop Movement, 1919-1920.” Journal of 
 American History 51 (December 1969): 460-75. 
Whatley, Warren “African-American Strikebreakers from the Civil War to the New 
 Deal.” Social Science History 17 (Winter 1993): 525-58. 
Theses and Dissertations  
Barker, Thomas. “Partners in Progress: The Galveston Wharf Company and the City of 
 Galveston, 1900-1930.” Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University, 1979. 
Kelley, James W. “Labor Problems of Longshoremen in the United States.” Ph.D. diss., 
 Boston University, 1941. 
 
 167
Maroney, James C. “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929.” Ph.D. diss., University of 
 Houston, 1975. 
Mullenix, Grady Lee. “A History of the Texas State Federation of Labor.” Ph.D. diss., 
 The University of Texas, 1955. 
Taylor, Allen Clayton. “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association from 1866 
 to 1924.” M.A. thesis, The University of Texas, 1968. 
Todes, Jay Littman. “Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas, 1900-
 1930.”  M.A. thesis, The University of Texas, 1949. 
Zeigler, Robert E. “The Workingman in Houston Texas, 1865-1914.” Ph.D. diss., Texas 
 Tech, 1972. 
Supplementary Sources Consulted 
Ayers, Edward L. The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Gordon, David M., Richard Edwards, Michael Reich.  Segmented Work, Divided 
 Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States.  
 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
 
 168
VITA 
 Joseph Anthony Abel was born on December 18, 1979, in Pasadena, Texas.  He 
graduated Summa Cum Laude from the University of Houston in December 2001 with a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in history.  After receiving his Master of Arts degree from the 
Texas A&M history department in December 2004, he will pursue a Master of 
Architecture degree with a certificate in historical preservation at the same institution.  
Mr. Abel can be reached at: 2205 Whatley Drive, Deer Park, Texas 77536.  
 
